According to the latest reports by the United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts (POE) on North Korea, educational collaboration with North Korean people or entities may entail potential proliferation dangers via the intangible switch of know-how (ITT). ITT includes transferring or making managed gadgets out there to an entity or particular person by way of intangible means, corresponding to e-mail, verbal communication, coaching or visible inspection. For occasion, information associated to delicate experiments might be shared with North Korean entities by way of e-mail or cloud computing companies, or North Korean people may achieve expertise in coping with managed tools via coaching offered by international consultants. Controlling ITT could play a major position in slowing down North Korea’s progress in creating weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

To mitigate the potential proliferation menace posed by North Korea, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2321 (2016) requires UN member states to cease scientific collaboration with North Korean people and entities, conduct an evaluation of proliferation dangers, and seek the advice of with the UN sanctions committee earlier than launching any technical cooperation. Implementing these restrictions in academia would require better cooperation and compliance on each authorities and institutional ranges. While there are lots of finest practices recognized by multilateral export management regimes, extra suggestions for enhancing ITT controls on this realm embrace: 1) a nationwide authority figuring out institutes in a collaborative relationship with North Korea and coping with delicate applied sciences; 2) conducting rigorous background screening of North Korean students earlier than partaking in educational cooperation; 3) educational establishments establishing a know-how management plan (TCP) earlier than internet hosting North Korean students; and 4) elevating consciousness of US reexport controls by each nationwide authorities and academia.

Why Do ITT Controls Matter, and How Are They Implemented?

As a rustic’s WMD program evolves towards a mature section, proliferators’ pursuits shift from procuring one-time-use bodily gadgets to buying delicate applied sciences. This “controlled technology” is defined as data that’s important to the efficient use, indigenous manufacturing and upkeep of things vital for WMDs. The possession of ample applied sciences for home WMD applications by proliferators would scale back reliance on procurement from international sources, and related sanctions and export controls would now not have the supposed affect of impeding progress of army development by proliferators.

Technology might be transferred by way of each tangible and intangible means, and ITT poses particularly important challenges for international nonproliferation efforts. First, it’s tough for export regulators to detect illicit ITT in a well timed method because of the non-physical nature of transactions. Additionally, proliferators can simply unfold the know-how to different proliferators by way of digital means. Moreover, know-how doesn’t have an expiration date. Once proliferators achieve sufficient expertise and grasp procedural information associated to delicate gadgets, the information will persist. Lastly, many nations haven’t carried out ITT controls but, doubtlessly permitting proliferators to use such weak hyperlinks.

One of the arenas that doubtlessly contain the utilization of ITT is academia via joint analysis, coaching, sharing information, mentorship, buying expertise in dealing with dual-use tools and participation in delicate analysis experiments. One notable instance is the Iraqi scientist Dr. Rihab Taha, who acquired her PhD in England within the Seventies with a concentrate on plant pathogens and have become the top of the Iraqi organic weapons program within the Nineteen Eighties. North Korea additionally actively seeks the acquisition of delicate applied sciences via ITT, particularly via educational collaborations with international institutes and students. More particularly, the UN POE noted that North Korean scientists have revealed a number of articles via joint research with international students within the areas associated to nuclear and missile purposes and that Kim Il Sung University’s institutional cooperation with universities overseas additionally poses potential proliferation issues.

Moreover, open-source data additionally signifies that North Korean students are nonetheless related to international analysis institutes and continued scientific collaborations. For occasion, North Korean scholar (or pupil) Jong Kwang Hyok is or was presumably affiliated with two Italian institutes, the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) and Scuola Internazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati, and performed joint analysis with international students from numerous nations till as lately as 2020. There can also be data suggesting that one among Jong’s educational companions, T. Azar, Yavar, is perhaps affiliated with the Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI) in Iran, which is at the moment below sanctions by the US Department of the Treasury.[1] As a mirrored image of those realities, the UNSCR 2321 prohibits scientific collaboration with North Korean people or teams formally sponsored by or representing the North Korean authorities, and UN member states ought to notify the Sanctions Committee of such actions (Appendix 1).

However, regardless of the significance of ITT controls, not all nations have an enough authorized framework for making certain that such controls are in place, which might be exploited by North Korea. In addition to the UNSCR 2321, there are a number of worldwide devices that present the authorized grounds to implement ITT controls. For instance, UNSCR 1718 (2006), which imposes sanctions on North Korea, requires UN member states to regulate know-how transfers to North Korea.[2] UNSCR 1540 (2004) obligates all UN member states to have export controls—together with know-how controls—so as to forestall non-state actors from buying WMD-related gadgets.[3] However, implementing such devices is topic to the interpretation and discretion of UN member states when it comes to establishing jurisdictions over the forms of transactions and people incurring these controls.

Meanwhile, there are different nations which have been rigorously implementing ITT controls. The United States’ dual-use export management regulation defines “exports” as protecting not solely cross-border transactions, corresponding to taking bodily gadgets in another country, but in addition transfers of know-how to foreigners throughout the nation, often known as “deemed exports.” Therefore, making delicate know-how out there to international nationals throughout the territory of the United States requires a know-how holder to acquire an export license from the regulatory authority. Many US corporations, universities and analysis institutes train enhanced due diligence by establishing an inner compliance program (ICP) to adjust to the deemed export controls. The European Union (EU), South Korea and different nations have additionally established enough authorized frameworks for ITT controls and are making an effort to stop proliferation within the educational area (Appendix 2).

The United Kingdom prohibits ITT involving proliferation actions via immigration controls by establishing the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS.) The ATAS requires worldwide college students admitted to applications involving delicate topics to acquire an ATAS certificates from the federal government of the United Kingdom and to submit the certificates as part of visa utility supplies. The immigration regulation of the United Kingdom prohibits universities from permitting college students with out a certificates to take programs topic to the ATAS.

Key Considerations of Academic Collaboration With North Korea

In 2006, the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) launched a document that places ahead finest practices for ITT controls, such because the institution of a authorized framework, post-export compliance monitoring, worldwide cooperation and outreach to industries and academia. Not all nations is perhaps able to readily undertake all of the measures acknowledged within the WA’s doc. However, encouraging these in academia to implement ITT controls and/or self-regulation as the primary line of protection is perhaps a much less onerous job to implement than different measures. Once a nationwide regulator identifies the analysis institutes and universities that possess delicate applied sciences, the regulator ought to be certain that these institutes take into consideration at the least three of the elements listed beneath when contemplating collaborating with North Korean entities or people on the educational stage.

Background Screening

Universities and analysis institutes ought to conduct an in depth background screening of potential educational companions from North Korea earlier than embarking on educational collaborations. There are a number of checkbox gadgets, corresponding to figuring out if a North Korean scholar has labored on delicate matters or has connections with different students engaged on delicate points. In this regard, educational monitor data, together with a scholar’s publication checklist and educational collaboration companions, could possibly be appropriate reference supplies within the threat evaluation course of.

For instance, suppose a international college is contemplating embarking on a scientific collaboration with North Korean students for nuclear fusion analysis (Appendix 3). If the proposed analysis goes to incorporate anybody concerned in lithium-6 research (Appendix 4), the attainable cooperation with these people could possibly be diverted towards army purposes. Meanwhile, the deliberate analysis venture could pose fewer proliferation issues if the research solely includes researchers engaged on magnetic confinement fusion (MCF) (Appendix 4) as a result of MCF is a department of fusion analysis associated to civilian purposes. According to UNSCR 2321, as soon as the potential educational alternate plan with North Korea is recognized as risk-free, the international associate ought to report back to the UN Sanctions Committee its intent to embark on such collaborations.[4]

Technology Control Plan (TCP)

Once a call is made to collaborate academically with North Korea, a college and analysis institute ought to put together a technology control plan (TCP), which is a doc that formalizes procedures and processes to guard restricted know-how from being accessed by unauthorized people. For instance, TCP-related tasks embrace the bodily safety of a laboratory and its {hardware}, encryption of delicate information and limiting the scope and matters of dialog with unauthorized folks. Having a TCP is especially essential since there’s a threat that North Korean students who don’t characterize their authorities or shouldn’t have expertise in proliferation actions should try to accumulate entry to delicate know-how. The newest UN POE report pointed out that the North Korean regime orders its students and college students overseas to ship experiences again to the nation.

Open-source data additionally suggests {that a} specific e-mail handle is shared amongst North Korean students and is instantly and not directly associated to North Korean entities past academia. For occasion, the aforementioned North Korean scholar, Jong Kwang Hyok, used [email protected] as his everlasting institute e-mail handle, which was additionally discovered for use by different DPRK students, corresponding to one who participated in an academic event in Italy in 2015. Moreover, this e-mail handle can also be the contact level for Chongsin Information Technology Agency, whose fax quantity is an identical to that of a number of sanctioned entities, corresponding to Mansudae Art Studio, Korea Ocean Maritime Management Company and Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation. This implies that no North Korean scholar might be utterly freed from the regime’s affect, which poses a possible threat of unintended transfers of know-how to North Korea with out a correct TCP (Appendix 6).

US Reexport Controls

Foreign universities and analysis institutes ought to pay attention to any tools or applied sciences containing US-origin gadgets of their amenities and place applicable controls over them so as to forestall unauthorized entry by North Korean students. In common, the US workouts extraterritorial export management jurisdiction over any gadgets originating from the nation. US export management laws outline transfers of US-origin gadgets from one international nation to a different international nation as a “reexport” and require licenses for such transactions. In different phrases, if a international educational institute transfers or releases any gadgets, apart from meals and medicines, that include US-origin know-how or items to North Korean nationals with out permission from the US authorities, it could represent a violation of US reexport controls, no matter the place the gadgets are situated.

There are indications that North Korean scientists is perhaps thinking about using gadgets of US origin for nuclear-related purposes. For occasion, the research revealed below the Atomic Energy Section within the Journal of Kim Il Sung University include some phrases that presumably characterize the product codes of microcircuits manufactured by US corporations, as proven in Appendix 7. The potential US-origin microprocessors recognized in Appendix 7 could possibly be categorized into three teams: 1) gadgets listed on each the US nationwide management checklist and the UN sanctions lists; 2) gadgets that seem on the US management checklist however not on the UN sanctions lists; and three) gadgets that aren’t listed on both checklist. Academia needs to be aware that every one three classes of things necessitate reexport license concerns when giving entry or transferring to North Korean students as a result of any non-listed US-origin gadgets are topic to the US export laws (known as EAR 99 gadgets).

Conclusion

ITT controls are an essential mechanism for impeding North Korea’s development in creating indigenous WMD manufacturing and upkeep capabilities. Although it’s fascinating to implement ITT controls, nations with much less developed export management methods could encounter difficulties in readily implementing them. In such circumstances, nationwide authorities reaching out to universities and analysis institutes could possibly be a sensible step in serving to to lift consciousness concerning the significance of ITT controls and nonproliferation efforts regarding North Korea. At the identical time, it’s particularly essential for tutorial establishments to do their due diligence as nicely when it comes to conducting thorough background screenings of North Korean nationals and entities, making ready TCPs to restrict entry to delicate data by unauthorized North Koreans, and constructing their very own consciousness of US reexport management necessities.

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DOWNLOAD PDF OF APPENDICES HERE, OR VIEW BELOW

Appendix 1. Examples of laws that management ITT.

 Academic collaboration between Jong Kwang Hyok and international students.

Azar’s affiliation with an Iranian entity associated to nuclear know-how.

NSTRI sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury.

Appendix 2. Examples of laws that management ITT.

Section 734.13 (a) of the United States Export Administration Regulations (EAR)

… Export means:

(1) An precise cargo or transmission out of the United States, together with the sending or taking of an merchandise out of the United States, in any method;

(2) Releasing or in any other case transferring “technology” or supply code (however not object code) to a international individual within the United States (a “deemed export”);…

Article 19 (1) of the Foreign Trade Law of the Republic of Korea

… Any one who intends to export…shall acquire permission…

1. 1. Transfer from Korea to a international nation;
   2. Transfer from a nationwide of the Republic of Korea (together with a authorized entity established pursuant to home legal guidelines) to a foreigner (together with a authorized entity established pursuant to international legal guidelines) within the Republic of Korea or a international nation.

Article 32-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act of the Republic of Korea

…transferred by any of the next strategies:

1. 1. Transfer via an data community, corresponding to phone, fax, and e-mail;
   2. Transfer via discourse or act, corresponding to course, schooling, coaching, and presentation;
   3. Transfer via recording units, corresponding to paper, movie, magnetic disc, optical disc, and semiconductor reminiscence equipment, or via a pc and different data processing units.

Article 2 (10) of Regulation (EU) 2021/821

… “exporter” means:

(a) any pure or authorized individual or any partnership that, on the time when the export declaration or the re-export declaration or an exit abstract declaration is accepted, holds the contract with the consignee within the third nation and has the facility to find out the sending of the gadgets out of the customs territory of the Union; the place no export contract has been concluded or if the holder of the contract doesn’t act by itself behalf, exporter means the one that has the facility to find out the sending of the gadgets out of the customs territory of the Union; or

(b) any pure or authorized individual or any partnership that decides to transmit software program or know-how by digital media, together with by fax, phone, piece of email or by another digital means to a vacation spot outdoors the customs territory of the Union or to make out there in an digital type such software program and know-how to pure or authorized individuals or to partnerships outdoors the customs territory of the Union.

…”supplier of technical help” means:

(a) any pure or authorized individual or any partnership that gives technical help from the customs territory of the Union into the territory of a 3rd nation;

(b) any pure or authorized individual or any partnership resident or established in a Member State that gives technical help throughout the territory of a 3rd nation; or

(c) any pure or authorized individual or any partnership resident or established in a Member State that gives technical help to a resident of a 3rd nation quickly current within the customs territory of the Union.

Appendix 4. Domestic Network of North Korean Nuclear Scientists.

The chart beneath reveals the community of North Korean nuclear students. It has been constructed primarily based on publication data. The measurement of every node signifies the full variety of articles revealed in collaboration with different students. The thickness of every line between nodes represents the variety of collaborative publications between two nodes. The node colours vary from yellow to pink, and the nearer a node is to pink signifies that the research performed by the respective scholar include extra choose delicate key phrases, that are listed in Appendix 5. For simpler viewing, the community chart beneath solely focuses on research revealed between 2013 and 2017. The totally different node colours don’t definitively decide the extent of proliferation dangers.

The sub-community represented by Ri Chol, Han Kyong Chan, and Choe Song Gun is expounded to lithium-6 analysis, whereas the sub-community protecting Kim Mun Ok and O Chol Su focuses on MCF and different fundamental fusion-related research.

Appendix 6. North Korean contact data shared amongst a number of people and entities.

Jong Kwang Hyok’s contact data.

Flyer from the Chongshin Informatics Centre.

Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation data.

Appendix 7: Indications of North Korean students utilizing presumably US-origin gadgets in nuclear analysis.

(Disclaimer: The writer of this text can not assure the validity of the data present in Appendix 7. Any similarity to the names of any actual merchandise or entities is only coincidental.)