China’s financial, diplomatic, and navy actions in South Asia and the Indian Ocean island states have New Delhi involved about Beijing’s rising affect in its neighborhood. In this episode of Global India, Tanvi Madan speaks with two specialists—Darshana Baruah from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Constantino Xavier of the Centre for Social and Economic Progress in New Delhi—who focus on how India is responding.

• 03:41 How India sees China’s actions in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka

• 09:28 How India views the Indian Ocean island states

• 12:06 How China engages with Indian Ocean island states

• 15:51 How is India responding to higher Chinese engagement in its continental neighborhood?

• 20:44 How India is partnering with different nations to compete with China in South Asia

• 23:30 How is India responding to higher Chinese engagement with the Indian Ocean island states?

• 27:09 India’s elevated diplomatic engagement with the Indian Ocean island states

• 29:48 Institutions within the area, and regional perceptions of India?

• 34:52 How non-aligned nations within the area are responding to India, China and different main powers

• 36:33 India, China and Indian Ocean regional mechanisms

• 39:36 China’s “clean slate” within the Indian Ocean area

• 43:06 Myths about India-China dynamics within the South Asian and Indian Ocean areas

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MADAN: Welcome to Global India, I’m Tanvi Madan a senior fellow on the Brookings Institution, the place I concentrate on Indian international coverage. In this new Brookings podcast, I’ll be turning the highlight on India’s partnerships, its rivalries, and its function on the worldwide stage. This season our conversations might be targeted on India’s relationship with China, and why and the way China-India ties are shaping New Delhi’s view of the world.

In 2017, China hosted his first Belt and Road Forum. Some Western nations like Greece, Italy, and Spain had been represented by their prime ministers. Australia despatched its commerce minister. The Japanese delegation was led by the secretary normal of the ruling celebration. And from the United States, a senior National Security Council official attended with a crew.

Conspicuous by its absence was India, and never simply because it was the one main nation not represented. What was putting was that India introduced that it was boycotting the discussion board. Moreover, New Delhi outlined its causes in a press release, together with the fiscal influence and lack of transparency of sure Belt and Road Initiative tasks, in addition to the impingement of India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within the case of another tasks.

This Indian choice mirrored its intensifying considerations about China’s rising actions and affect in India’s continental and maritime neighborhood. Beijing’s actions in South Asia and the Indian Ocean island states and India’s considerations about them proceed the Belt and Road Initiative. But Delhi’s wariness has elevated because of the scale of actions and worries that China is gaining political affect and shaping the strategic decisions of India’s neighbors to incorporate dissuading them from respecting India’s sensitivities.

All that is sophisticated by the truth that India and China have overlapping peripheries, with Delhi’s actions in Southeast Asia rising as effectively. And so the 2 Asian giants will proceed to bump up towards one another within the area.

New Delhi’s enhanced considerations have led to shifts in its views and insurance policies together with a extra welcoming method than up to now of American actions in South Asia and the Indian Ocean area, and a willingness to seek the advice of and cooperate with Washington within the area.

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In at present’s episode, we’ll have a look at China-India dynamics in South Asia. In this area, consider two classes. One class consists of the nations which might be aligned: Pakistan with China and Bhutan with India. We’ll contemplate them in a future episode. Today, we’ll have a look at the second class, that’s non-aligned South Asia, and discover India’s notion of Chinese actions in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and different Indian Ocean island states, in addition to look at how New Delhi is responding.

My visitors are Constantino Xavier, a nonresident fellow with us at Brookings, and a fellow on the Centre for Social and Economic Progress in New Delhi, and Darshana Baruah, fellow on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the place she directs the Indian Ocean Initiative. Both are engaged on books, Constantino on how India’s democratic expertise and values at dwelling have formed its international coverage in direction of Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. And Darshana, on the island states of the Indian Ocean and the area’s rising significance.

MADAN: Constantino Xavier—Tino—welcome to the Global India podcast.

XAVIER: Hi Tanvi. Great to be right here.

MADAN: Darshana Baruah, welcome to you as effectively.

BARUAH: Thank you, Tanvi. Good to be right here.

03:41 How India sees China’s actions in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka

MADAN: We’re going to be speaking about India’s neighbors at present, and the way New Delhi sees rising Chinese exercise within the area in addition to China’s rising affect. Tino, we’re going to begin with you and I’m going to ask you to speak about three of India’s neighbors. One, Nepal, which is a landlocked nation mendacity between China and India; one that’s India’s continental and maritime neighbor: Bangladesh; and one other one which is an island state neighbor of India’s: Sri Lanka. Tino, inform us a bit of bit about how India sees China’s actions within the area in these three nations specifically.

XAVIER: Thanks, Tanvi. I used to be considering the easiest way to perhaps clarify, particularly to an American viewers, what’s taking place on this area is that it’s very near what occurred within the Nineteen Fifties and ‘60s when the Soviet Union started to build up its presence in Central and South America in what was in the United States’ yard below the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century. This was an space that the U.S. had been very influential, and all of the sudden you had an adversarial energy poking round within the fast periphery.

So at present, I believe that’s the sense additionally in India, that there’s a sense of risk, competitors, adversarial relations with China in its fast periphery. Countries, those you talked about, that historically trusted India, on financial help, on commerce relations, on political and safety provisions.

So, China, the final ten years, has established very quickly a foothold in these nations throughout completely different sectors. And subsequently, the tough India-China relations because the Sixties with ups and downs—and we’re seeing a selected down since 2020 in India-China relations—is manifesting itself in competitors and battle, sometimes. Diplomatic, financial conflicts, political generally, in these three neighboring nations the place China and India typically discover themselves in numerous camps, have completely different preferences, other ways to have interaction, and help these nations’ completely different political preferences—like we simply noticed within the elections held within the Maldives just lately.

So, there’s that sense of competitors and risk. And there’s numerous dimensions to this. We simply completed right here on the Centre for Social and Economic Progress a report on how China engages South Asia with a number of case research on Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. This is a regional effort with specialists from these three nations who helped me and my co-editor, Jabin Jacob from Shiv Nadar University, perceive the depth and the scope of China’s affect in these three nations.

It is one which manifests itself in economics. China at present is among the main commerce and funding companions of those three nations. In phrases of financial connectivity, infrastructure relations, China at present is a serious funder of infrastructure modernization in these three nations. For instance, probably the most recognized tasks is the Hambantota port in southern Sri Lanka, but in addition a brand new airport in Nepal, energy sector in Bangladesh. And additionally these three nations are all a part of the Belt and Road Initiative that China has partnered with them on. India has not—India determined to remain away. So that’s one.

A political pillar is, after all, additionally crucial. That’s a really new phenomenon. Today we have now the Communist Party of China establishing direct hyperlinks with the political events in energy and in opposition in these three nations. There are workshops, there are coaching periods on the Xi Jinping means for growth and governance. So you’ve gotten a political dimension to growth.

You have a navy and safety pillar. The People’s Liberation Army historically remained absent from this area apart from Pakistan and a little bit of Myanmar, which is one other neighbor of India. But in Bangladesh, Nepal, that relationship has intensified. China, for instance, simply transferred two submarines to the Bangladesh navy; it continues to coach and equip most of Bangladesh’s navy property. With Nepal for the primary time, that could be a sandwiched nation, landlocked between India and China, you had the primary joint navy train between the PLA and the Nepal military.

And lastly, the final pillar, Tanvi, that’s essential is the governance and the regulatory pillar. This is one thing that stunned us. We discuss lots concerning the financial flows, commerce, navy, safety realms during which China establishes a foothold world wide, on this case specifically in South Asia. But the deeper unknown influence that China’s having on setting requirements, laws, regulation on telecommunications, on infrastructure, on environmental and social assessments for infrastructure, and the way they need to appear like. This could be very attention-grabbing. This is state-owned enterprises from China who’re not directly by way of parliament engagement, political engagements, assume tank engagements, participating civil society and in some ways establishing a system that might be favorable to Chinese corporations and Chinese pursuits over the subsequent many years.

MADAN: And it’s attention-grabbing, Tino, as a result of you’ve gotten written about how one of many issues that India is having to get used to is that it used to have a monopoly as such within the neighborhood or a relative monopoly. And now it’s having to cope with a extra aggressive surroundings within the area.

09:28 How India views the Indian Ocean island states

Darshana, let’s transfer to India’s maritime neighborhood, the place we’ve seen some related developments, additionally one development that Tino alluded to: whereas there’s this new and renewed focus and curiosity from China because of what was once the One Belt One Road, now the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s engagement precedes that. And you’ve seen Beijing improve its engagement within the Indian Ocean area. So, let’s transfer to India’s maritime neighborhood and discuss to us concerning the Indian Ocean island states with whom India has had longstanding ties, however the place Beijing has been rising its investments, in addition to its affect lately.

BARUAH: Thanks, Tanvi. I agree with plenty of what Tino’s talked about by way of a few of the complexities that India has needed to cope with in its competitors with China. In the Indian Ocean area, I believe the story is barely completely different from, say, India’s continental neighborhood, as a result of I see two developments. One is, after all, the best way India itself seems to be at maritime safety and the broader Indian Ocean area—within the sense that the ocean has historically been divided into japanese Indian Ocean and western Indian Ocean, and it has had a continental division of a maritime area.

So, Sri Lanka and Maldives is considered by way of the prism of South Asia, whereas say, Seychelles and Mauritius, which is on the western Indian Ocean together with Madagascar and Comoros, comes below the Africa lens, which has a extra of a continental view than say a maritime view. And I believe someplace India has additionally made that distinction regardless of having actually robust relationship with Sri Lanka, Maldives, after which Mauritius and Seychelles throughout the Africa bureau. It has had completely different ranges of interactions and engagements with the completely different units of islands.

So once we discuss concerning the islands of the Indian Ocean area, there are six. So from east to west there’s Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Comoros, all the best way to the Mozambique Channel, and this facet is the Andaman Sea. And collectively that constitutes the Indian Ocean, everything of the Indian Ocean area.

The one facet of the competitors is, due to India’s proximity to Sri Lanka and Maldives, that competitors within the latest years have been felt extra acutely. Because mix that with what’s taking place with Bangladesh or Nepal and even conversations on Afghanistan, Pakistan, it feels extra accentuated—there’s a way of urgency that’s felt in Delhi in a means that developments in, say, the center of the ocean, which is, say, in Mauritius and Seychelles, stay someplace barely at a distance. And Madagascar and Comoros, I’d say, is just about on the periphery of it.

12:06 How China engages with Indian Ocean island states

Whereas from the China perspective, for my part, China seems to be on the area as one and engages equally with all six islands. So, the explanation with regards to the islands of the Indian Ocean area why we hear extra about Sri Lanka and Maldives and fewer about Madagascar and Comoros is due to how India views that and what’s being mentioned in India’s political engagements.

For occasion, China has an embassy in all six islands within the Indian Ocean area. It’s the one main energy to have a political and a diplomatic footprint throughout all of the Indian Ocean islands. Nobody else has it. Not the United States, not UK, not France, not India, not Japan, not Australia, no different participant has it.

So, plenty of the engagement has basically actually been sustained over a number of many years. But mixed with what has been taking place on continental South Asia, mixed with China’s bigger method and engagement on the Belt and Road Initiative, and mixed with China’s even increasing engagements with, say, Africa and Middle East, which all have an Indian Ocean coast, the dialog on the Indian Ocean area and China’s rising presence is starting to be felt extra as a result of it’s starting to be mentioned extra.

But plenty of them have basically been a continuation of plenty of the tasks which have both, as you stated, predates the Belt and Road Initiative, or basically is one thing that China has been constructing on strategically and politically.

And as a result of there was by no means basically direct competitors between India and China at sea in a means that has existed throughout the land borders, I believe the warmth of that or the stress of that’s felt extra acutely. And now mixed with the entire continental troubles and the continental escalating tensions, their presence within the maritime area is starting to be felt in a strategic and political degree in a means that India had not likely checked out it.

But I’d say in competitors throughout the Indian Ocean area, it’s an evolution over a time frame. It’s not an growth of the final 5 years and even ten years. It’s simply that we’re listening to extra of it due to the mix of a number of various factors, which results in the query or the dialog that how the area is reacting to it. And we are able to go into that later. But basically that the response or the engagement from regional gamers—the maritime neighbors in direction of India—can be a mirrored image of how India has engaged with these neighbors during the last a number of many years.

For occasion, I can not bear in mind any cabinet-level visits to Madagascar, Comoros from India in not less than within the final a number of many years. But you’ll not battle to seek out such high-level visits, say, from China. Even when Prime Minister Modi went to Sri Lanka in 2015, I believe it was after a spot of 28 years that an Indian political chief had gone there. When they went to Maldives it was a spot of a number of many years.

So, it’s not one thing that has occurred in a single day or as a result of it’s a direct response of India-China competitors on the continental border. It’s simply that the maritime dialog was by no means a entrance and heart dialog in India’s international coverage engagement in a means it has turn out to be within the final 5 years, and why we hear and see the competitors being performed out within the Indian Ocean area.

MADAN: It’s attention-grabbing that each of you’ve gotten made the purpose that what we’re seeing by way of India’s neighborhood and Chinese exercise there, and the way India is seeing it is extremely a lot related to the continental context, notably the intensifying of the border dispute and that broader intensifying sense of competitors. But additionally, that this can be a reminder that this competitors between India and China now goes past— and has for some time gone past—that border dispute. And it’s concerning the neighborhood as effectively.

15:51 How is India responding to higher Chinese engagement in its continental neighborhood?

One of the issues I’ve seen that’s modified as effectively is that you simply used to listen to a number of years in the past from Indian officers, and I’d say this could be a couple of decade in the past, that, sure, you recognize, China is constructing roads or infrastructure on this area, and that’s fairly secular infrastructure. Everybody can use it. There was a debate about whether or not there was going to be a Chinese “string of pearls” of ports, of dual-use infrastructure. But it was largely seen as not from such a aggressive prism as it’s at present.

But what you’ve seen more and more is not only a way that this financial exercise has elevated—as, Tino, you talked about, the political engagement, governance engagement; Darshana, you talked about the diplomatic engagement—but in addition that this financial exercise is coming with strategic affect, and China actively probably shaping these nations’ decisions, not nearly India, but in addition, for instance, concerning the U.S. And we’ve seen this in a number of completely different nations and perhaps we are able to come to that.

But provided that we’ve talked about this aggressive prism and these developments, what has New Delhi been doing about this? How is it responding to China’s actions within the context of its personal considerations about Chinese engagement and affect within the neighborhood?

XAVIER: Yeah, Tanvi, you used the phrase “competition,” and I believe all of us agree that competitors brings out the most effective out of us. I believe it forces us to carry out extra, higher, rethink methods of participating.

And, Tanvi, you’re the queen of relationship metaphors in geopolitics. I see your e book behind you on Fateful Triangle and lots of others you’ve used to clarify how nations additionally take into consideration choices.

Let me experiment additionally to clarify how India is responding in two methods to courting its neighbors. When you are taking these nations without any consideration, smaller states round your periphery, you get very lazy. You don’t carry out effectively. You take them without any consideration. So, you don’t make investments a lot in these relationships, which was the case, such as you talked about, until the Nineteen Nineties and 2000s between India and Nepal, India and Bangladesh, India and the Maldives, India and Sri Lanka. These are nations that had been insulated economically from the remainder of the world as India was. They lived in some ways below the shadow of this regional behemoth, India.

Now, what China introduced, competitors, has compelled India to rethink the phrases of its relationships with these nations. And it does it in two methods. One is clearly by courting them and giving them extra. So, somewhat than denying financial support, help, or sitting on requests for help—that was typically the pure response from India simply because they weren’t a precedence; you can afford to not make investments—and that’s not tenable, which signifies that India’s shifting. And that is the primary response from a logic of denial or nonperformance to one in every of delivering—extra, higher, and sooner—due to what China is doing in these neighboring nations.

That signifies that additionally nations, Nepal or Sri Lanka, count on extra from India. They need extra. In the previous, generally they themselves had been reluctant about financial linkages, commerce linkages with India, companies liberalization, for instance, by way of mobility of expertise. Bangladesh at present is negotiating a serious financial partnership with India as a result of it’s graduating as a middle-income nation in 2026. And actually, in relative phrases, at present is as rich, if not wealthier, than India. It has finished very effectively.

So, these nations see in India a development engine and subsequently India must ship far more by way of that financial interdependence. It’s doing lots on the fundamental transportation infrastructure that this area has dismantled. India simply inaugurated the primary two petroleum merchandise pipelines within the area. India is growing new railway linkages with its neighbors. It’s upgrading its border administration infrastructure so commerce can move sooner by way of digital mechanisms and programs. The ports of India are actually lastly giving entry to landlocked nations like Bhutan and Nepal to import and export and talk with their markets with the remainder of the world.

Finally, we have now now trilateral energy connectivity between Bangladesh, Nepal, and India. India’s typically opposed its function as a transit nation for Nepal to export energy to Bangladesh. And Nepal, Bhutan—each nations within the Himalayas, within the mountains—sit on a few of the world’s largest hydropower potential. So lastly, these two nations are actually exporting to India, to Bangladesh, and to 3rd nations. So that’s the primary one.

20:44 How India is partnering with different nations to compete with China in South Asia

The second response, the response, Tanvi, once more to your relationship metaphor, is partnerships with different nations. As China has proven as much as be a really robust aggressive participant for India, I believe India has additionally realized that it has extra to realize by partnering and growing complementarities, coordinating, pooling efforts with nations past the area, contained in the area. That signifies that at present India could be very comfy working with Japan in Sri Lanka and in Bangladesh. In reality, it took India to nudge Japan to reengage with Sri Lanka after their main monetary default final yr. The Japanese had invested lots in Sri Lanka and had been a bit reluctant to return to Sri Lanka. It took plenty of political and diplomatic effort from India to have interaction Japan. And give situations to Japan, to say, please come into Sri Lanka, we’d like you in Sri Lanka to help with capital, with knowhow, with skilling, with infrastructure growth the revival of the Sri Lankan financial system, which in flip advantages southern India specifically by way of financial interdependence.

With the U.S., there are some areas, and a few geographic and sectoral areas the place India should still have some reluctance about working with the U.S. But on most accounts, India welcomes a higher American presence in Nepal, the place, for instance, below a latest settlement the U.S. has offered $600 million price grant for electrical energy connectivity between Nepal and India. U.S. simply opened up a brand new embassy within the Maldives. So that’s all seen positively at present.

The similar might be stated about France. We noticed the primary ever go to by a president of France to Sri Lanka. President Macron was in Colombo just lately. We noticed the European Union displaying up throughout the area. The European Union at present is working with India to develop power grid connectivity in japanese South Asia by way of the European Investment Bank.

So that’s the second response. India’s far more comfy to work in complementary phrases with different nations past the area to match and surpass what China’s doing in its personal periphery.

MADAN: And that settlement that you simply talked about with the U.S. and India and Nepal working collectively was a part of or below the rubric of the Millennium Challenge Corporation compact that the U.S. and Nepal signed, which some reviews point out was one thing Beijing was truly attempting to run interference on.

We’ve seen related reviews of Beijing additionally attempting to train affect to form decisions vis-à-vis India and the U.S. in Sri Lanka, for instance, as effectively, whether or not it was a visiting forces settlement or whether or not it was sure financial tasks with the U.S., India, or Japan.

23:30 How is India responding to higher Chinese engagement with the Indian Ocean island states?

Darshana, what concerning the Indian Ocean island states? How is India approaching these nations within the context of elevated Chinese engagement and affect?

BARUAH: I believe, Tanvi, initially the response was truly fairly reactionary within the sense that all of the sudden there was this collection of latest growth tasks throughout the Indian Ocean Islands, but in addition on littoral states. So, the view that all of the sudden China was investing a lot wanted a response out of it. And I believe it was not truly all of the sudden, it was taking place fairly incrementally over time. But then it got here to consideration with the Belt and Road Initiative, and China’s submarines in Indian Ocean area for the primary time. It was a collection of things that led to love, okay, China really is now current within the Indian Ocean area, utilizing fishing vessels, survey vessels, submarines, deployments, and growth tasks.

So, the preliminary responses had been fairly reactionary. In the sense that I believe, to one thing Tino stated, that for a really lengthy time frame India remained unchallenged in being a key accomplice for lots of its neighbors. And for the primary time it was starting to really feel that stress. So, if China was constructing a port, so can we construct a port for a port and a bridge for a bridge?

And I believe we did see a collection of bulletins of infrastructure tasks, even initiatives that didn’t actually stand time. I believe like Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. the place India and Japan introduced that, after which it didn’t actually materialize. Because there was this scrambling to work with whoever was accessible to announce options to Chinese-led infrastructure tasks. And was far more a reactionary response than truly considering by way of.

And I believe sooner or later there was a pause and a reevaluation of the way to deal with this problem, as a result of it was not going to be short-term or perhaps a mid-term problem. It’s a long-term problem. And the belief that these growth tasks are embedded in lengthy partnerships between the island nations, or littoral nations, and China.

And over time, I’m seeing undoubtedly higher engagement with the island nations, with these littorals, to grasp the feelings on the bottom. The one factor India has finished effectively within the Indian Ocean area popping out is using the benefits of its geography. And to simply give a really particular instance: COVID. At the time of COVID, the Indian navy did lead in offering provide and supplies, whether or not it’s medicines, whether or not it’s taking medical camps, offering masks.

When the world started to close down and India was evacuating its personal residents and college students from China, it did convey again college students of Maldives and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to say that, look, I’m your very closest neighbor. We can assist. We will all the time be right here, whether or not we have now growth points, whether or not we have now engagements or financial ties. India was all the time going to be within the Indian Ocean area. It was all the time going to return again. So, that is how we are able to provide that assist.

India had a reasonably spectacular vaccine outreach throughout the Indian Ocean area, that I believe it provided it equally to all of the islands, but in addition littorals. But it was not simply restricted to vaccines. It did lengthen to crucial medicines, it did lengthen to foodgrains, rice at a time the place the entire world was actually shutting down.

And I believe India used that benefit of geography to reengage with the area, to say that there are completely different ways in which we can assist, there are completely different ways in which we’re prepared to assist. And we’re additionally prepared to return to your support when the remainder of the world is shutting down. And I believe that has actually had an influence. And from the area additionally to see that, sure, you may’t be in a binary of India versus China, as a result of each are essential in numerous methods. And additionally accepting the geographic actuality of India and the Indian Ocean area that did come true.

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27:09 India’s elevated diplomatic engagement with the Indian Ocean island states

And I’d additionally say, one other factor within the final couple of years that has actually been useful and does carry plenty of weight is the diplomatic presence and diplomatic footprint. The common visits, not simply on the prime minister degree, but in addition extra frequently on the embassy degree, international ministers’ degree, in a means that we’re used to not seeing within the final decade or so. So, you’ve gotten an election in Sri Lanka or Maldives, you’ll have an Indian official proper there, one of many first ones there, to congratulate the brand new authorities. We noticed that occur in Sri Lanka. I’d count on some form of response with Maldives as effectively.

The diplomatic footprint, the significance of the sovereignty of the nation, that’s essential. And for India to take up time and to make that go to, and never simply go to the larger powers of the Western nations and even Japan or Australia, has gone a good distance in starting to appropriate the narrative that it turned lazy in that engagement, that strategic inertia that India felt or was additionally, I believe, caught up in within the final couple of many years. It’s starting to alter that.

So, I do see a greater engagement within the area, higher perceptions, willingness to hearken to the feelings on the bottom, whether or not you agree or not. It was one thing that was laborious to speak with Delhi for a really lengthy time frame. But now there’s a recognition that on the bottom, sure, individuals, political events, and the native notion of India are completely different. And then accepting that it’s completely different, however then they’re nonetheless seeing a job to play.

There’s undoubtedly an extended approach to go as a result of the political baggage is critical. I’d say that the native notion is fairly recent by way of the variety of years that India, not less than from the regional perspective, they felt that India had not deserted them, however obtained lazy in that engagement. I believe it actually goes to plenty of the issues that Tino talked about, taking time in processing requests or arising with options. And I believe India’s actually taken a concerted effort in addressing these points.

And only a ultimate instance on how structurally India is constructing that in in its response to the neighborhood is the Indian Ocean Division throughout the Ministry of External Affairs—a separate division that has come as much as higher perceive what coordination mechanisms are required to essentially have a look at the island nations of the Indian Ocean area with its maritime id, with its geography. You have now a separate division attempting to coordinate that and attempting to determine the place does this slot in inside, say, India and Africa outreach, or India and South Asia outreach, or India and neighborhood outreach. But there’s nonetheless a separate division wanting on the Indian Ocean area, which I believe goes to speak about how structurally India is starting or has begun to overview its engagements within the area as a response to what it noticed arising in a short time and quick in Chinese engagements throughout the world.

29:48 Institutions within the area, and regional perceptions of India?

MADAN: Tino, you talked about that India’s moved from denial to supply; Darshana, from extra dictating to listening. But there’s this facet the place India additionally finds methods to clarify its pink strains to its neighbors as effectively. So that facet hasn’t completely disappeared. And it’s one thing that doesn’t occur publicly. But we do hear reviews of it and infrequently from the area.

I simply do wish to ask each of you a few observe up questions to simply have temporary solutions. One is to simply discuss a bit of bit about organizational infrastructure. We used to have in South Asia, the South-Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, or SAARC. We’ve seen some shift away from that. Could you discuss that?

But additionally this different facet, which each of you alluded to, is regional perceptions. We’ve seen these nations in some methods undertake an method that India took within the Cold War, which was non-alignment and enjoying one off towards the opposite generally, making the most of competitors to profit. Have you seen that just lately within the neighborhood? And the place do you assume that can go by way of how the neighbors are literally seeing India-China competitors?

XAVIER: On three accounts: one, organizational cooperation establishments. There was once the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation. In reality, it nonetheless is, but it surely’s been within the freezer now for six, seven years, just because India and Pakistan don’t get alongside effectively presently. They have lowered their relations to one in every of their many file lows, however that’s the place we’re presently. So there’s no urge for food to work by way of regional establishments from either side.

This additionally needs to be understood from a geoeconomic perspective. If you look at present at Pakistan’s financial development and connectivity priorities, they’re aligned with China northwards. They’re aligned southwards in direction of the Gulf area. And they’re aligned westwards in direction of Central Asia, Afghanistan partially, relying on what occurs there. So there’s no japanese curiosity in Pakistan to develop financial development, et cetera.

Vice versa for India. If you have a look at the place the investments have gone into the efforts from authorities, the political visits that Darshana was speaking about which were historic after many years typically. If you look, for instance, at a research we did of the place India presently has opened and presently has consulates, diplomatic missions beneath the embassies in capitals, they’re virtually presently all in direction of the east and south. That means within the Bay of Bengal area, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, which is a maritime neighbor of India we neglect typically, in addition to Thailand, Sri Lanka. So, India’s curiosity has been in direction of the east and the south geographically talking. Of course, this can be a easy approach to clarify it. But subsequently there’s very restricted curiosity for India and Pakistan to work by way of widespread regional organizations for that development crucial that I used to be discussing earlier than.

Second, on the politics that you simply talked about, I can’t resist paraphrasing one in every of India’s strategic doyens in India, Ok. Subrahmanyam, who occurs to be the daddy of India’s present exterior affairs minister, who within the Eighties took this very real looking tackle politics within the area. And mainly stated, no matter we do, we’ll by no means be cherished within the area. He stated, you recognize, you may work actually laborious. You might be generally feared, disrespected. At finest, for those who work actually laborious and ship, then perhaps there’ll be some sense of tolerance or respect for you as the good massive nation, massive neighbor, massive brother on this area, surrounded by actually smaller nations, besides Pakistan.

So, I believe additionally one of many illusions you’ve gotten typically right here in India is that you simply have to be cherished by your neighbors. They should admire and be grateful. And why are we simply not cherished? I imply, I don’t see that as passionately. I believe naturally all smaller nations have real considerations that transcend politics. I’ll offer you one instance. When India tried to do a serious effort that each one economists and technocrats assume is essential for regional financial development, which is a motor autos settlement for vans, cabs, and automobiles to cross borders in a facilitated means. Bhutan rejected this in Parliament as a result of there have been considerations a couple of mass entry of autos from India, probably dangers of migration. There had been native lobbies of taxi drivers and truckers that opposed this.

So it’s very tough to advertise a regional interdependence and connectivity agenda as a result of there can even be political losers from that political financial system change within the area. So that’s taking place. It will proceed to occur. It’s one thing India has to handle, and it is going to be tough.

34:52 How non-aligned nations within the area are responding to India, China and different main powers

Last level is about this non-alignment perspective you introduced in, Tanvi. And completely, I believe these nations are doing to India what India has finished, and in some ways nonetheless does, with different higher powers. This signifies that these nations are studying the tough artwork of balancing, diversifying dangers, increasing partnerships—and going past the India-China binary additionally in search of different choices. That’s why I discussed Japan being welcome within the area.

That’s why the European Union now has an Indo-Pacific coverage and establishing a rising presence in Sri Lanka, in Bangladesh—economics, commerce, diplomatic, safety presence. Individual nations from Europe are doing this. France specifically, however Germany is starting to do it too. The United States, I’ve talked about earlier than, can be increasing its community and its presence within the area. So these nations are studying that.

The greatest problem, although, Tanvi, is that it’s very simple to have a imaginative and prescient of non-alignment, however to implement it to coverage selections could be very tough. These are small states and so they don’t have a lot state capability typically. This means, for instance, completely different tasks and deciding which one goes to be extra aligned with our developmental ambitions, with our governance and political preferences. And there I see some concern, many of those nations wish to play the balancing recreation, however typically find yourself committing to China an excessive amount of or to India or to different nations. And let’s see how that pans out. In Sri Lanka, actually, there are nice considerations about how Sri Lanka was not in a position to play this non-aligned recreation and paid a value in its default final yr.

36:33 India, China and Indian Ocean regional mechanisms

MADAN: Darshana, have we seen in organizational integration phrases India rethink or reshape its method to a few of the organizations within the area? There’ve been a number of. We’ve additionally seen the Indian National Security Advisor now meet with a few of his counterparts frequently. What are the opposite developments we’ve seen on this area? Especially as China in some methods within the neighborhood, can be attempting to alter the best way it offers with them. We’ve seen China name these group conferences of South Asian leaders or ministers that don’t embody India, on the facet so to talk. But, Darshana, within the Indian Ocean, what have we seen?

BARUAH: Similar, Tanvi. Of course, essentially the most distinguished regional construction that Indian Ocean has is the Indian Ocean Rim Association, which brings collectively the littorals and the island states throughout the ocean, which is once more, one thing that India could be very a lot been a pacesetter in that group, in addition to IONS, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which brings collectively the navies of the world.

But there are additionally, for example, China just lately arrange a China-Indian Ocean islands discussion board, recognizing the absence of a platform that brings collectively all of the islands of the Indian Ocean area. Because, for example, say, Sri Lanka and Maldives on the japanese Indian Ocean facet. And the remainder, which is Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Comoros, in some type or the opposite converse French and they’re throughout the African Union, however additionally they have connections with EU.

So there was this division that I believe has this imaginary line that runs proper throughout the Indian Ocean area, placing them in numerous camps.

And India interacts with them both bilaterally—so you’ve gotten the India-Sri Lanka or India-Maldives—or you’ve gotten the trilateral now that you simply’re referring to, on the NSA-level of India-Sri Lanka-Maldives, after which bringing in Mauritius as observer or bringing in Seychelles.

But as India and, say, island nations, there wasn’t something that features all of that. Because Madagascar and Comoros in India’s maritime purview is totally on the periphery and maybe Comoros is sitting outdoors of that boundary as effectively. It’s one thing so new. And perhaps lots of people won’t agree with this, however for my part, India is a coastal nation, but it surely’s not a maritime nation within the sense that it doesn’t assume maritime safety is international coverage in the best way that it thinks continental. So, it has a big coast. So, it reacts in response and engages with points that emerges from the ocean, from the ocean, whether or not it’s on the financial facet of it or whether or not it’s on the safety facet of it. But from a strategic, political, and diplomatic facet, India’s not a maritime nation in the best way we’re used to interested by maritime powers and naval powers and maritime nations. The navy’s a special dialog.

So it misses factors or it misses developments that it might have been a lot simpler for India to do, to arrange an Indian Ocean islands discussion board. Beijing was the primary one to even provide it. Why did it miss Delhi’s thoughts to have one thing like that regardless of having such nearer interactions with them? And I believe it does return to how India views its personal geography and the way it thinks about its international coverage engagements.

39:36 China’s “clean slate” within the Indian Ocean area

On regional, additionally this different factor, which is China does have a reasonably clear slate within the Indian Ocean area, versus the western Pacific or South China Seas. China has no sovereignty disputes within the Indian Ocean area. It has no political baggage. It doesn’t have any unhealthy blood or unhealthy historical past with anyone in there. It is that this new, alternate, productive participant with a clear political slate with plenty of capital and an curiosity, willingness, and time to put money into there. So everybody’s welcomed that, whereas it was India lacking or whether or not it was U.S. utilizing the Indian Ocean for its engagements with Afghanistan and Middle East however not likely participating within the ocean itself.

So, China was this productive, artistic new participant that’s welcome. So, China within the Indian Ocean just isn’t essentially a foul participant or problematic participant. China just isn’t embroiled in problems with, say, Chagos or Diego Garcia points in a means that different nations are invested. Or territorial disputes between Madagascar, Comoros, and France that could be a legacy problem from colonialism.

So from a regional perspective, China is welcome. And perhaps the bigger gamers are starting to really feel threatened by what China can provide to smaller nations. That’s whenever you’re attempting to push them out.

An attention-grabbing latest growth: we hosted the Islands Dialogue in New York simply final month and we had the president of Sri Lanka converse there. And he talked about the Quad. He talked about Quad and AUKUS, as these minilateral, multilateral, smaller boards amongst India and Western powers which have come up. But then he alluded to the purpose that, how essential is it for the area? And Sri Lanka is simply assuming chairmanship of IORA [Indian Ocean Rim Association]. And, he was saying, how essential or how engaged is Quad with IORA? And is Quad simply basically a mechanism to compete and push again China or is it actually going to have interaction with the area?

And I believe there is a matter within the sense that you simply do have multilateral organizations and you’ve got minilaterals that resolve amongst themselves on what they need to do within the area with out actually discussing with the area. And that is true for entire Indian Ocean and the Pacific. And I believe that could be a reflection of the sentiment on the bottom.

One final thing that I’d say by way of India’s engagement on the governance, but in addition the way it’s trying to appropriate its narrative. An enormous pillar of its re-engagement additionally has been diaspora engagement to essentially leverage or return into the Indian diaspora throughout islands. I’ll make this distinction that the diaspora in islands and in bigger nations is a bit of completely different and the sentiment is completely different. Like, for example, within the U.S. it’s Indian Americans. But the Indian diaspora in Mauritius don’t have that hyperlink, like heritage hyperlink, they don’t name themselves Indian Mauritians, they’re Mauritians, they’re Sri Lankans, they’re Maldivians.

And the historical past of their motion to these islands was a lot extra completely different than the historical past of immigration of Indians to America that the idea interprets very otherwise on islands—the place it’s virtually seen as India attempting to impose or use these heritage hyperlinks to say that, okay, that is anyone someplace stated that is Mauritius is mini-India. It’s not checked out positively. The diaspora connection just isn’t essentially one thing that may work in favor of India as a result of it’s truly seen as India attempting to leverage Indian final names which have existed for many years and centuries on a special context in its benefit. Whereas India is attempting to make the parallel of how diasporas have labored in Indian America and the way it may work in Fiji and Maldives. But the context is totally completely different and India ought to be a bit of cautious of that.

MADAN:

43:06 Myths about India-China dynamics within the South Asian and Indian Ocean areas

And that Darshana, I believe, can be a part of some studying taking place, that should occur on New Delhi’s finish by way of how these nations have seen India’s earlier method and even some features of its present method. But I wish to finish our dialogue at present asking you a query we ask on the finish of every phase or episode, which is, what’s the delusion that you’ve got heard about India-China dynamics, in your case within the South Asian and Indian Ocean area? Tino?

XAVIER: So, I needed to go together with the parable of pro-India, anti-India, pro-China, anti-China, which is a extremely restrictive delusion that doesn’t assist us perceive what’s taking place in these smaller states. It’s far more advanced. But let me go together with one other one quoting what a senior Thai diplomat instructed me just lately. He stated, In this present geopolitical turbulence, we don’t wish to be compelled to make decisions, however we additionally can not afford to not make decisions. So, the parable that many smaller nations have is they’ll keep away, impartial from India, China, U.S., and the large powers which might be combating it out. We can keep in our little nook and be impartial. I believe that’s an incredible delusion. Countries are coming below stress, smaller nations, too. They have company, they’ve energy. They could not have as a lot as massive nations, and so they can not afford to not make decisions. They must make decisions, a selection on Monday that’s completely different than the selection on Wednesday and on Friday. But they should make very knowledgeable decisions. And for that they want good capability by way of experience, bureaucratic data, and strategic and political impetus to take these tough selections.

MADAN: Darshana?

BARUAH: I agree with Tino utterly. And the parable is that tends to be a story that China’s presence within the Indian Ocean area is to counter and compete India basically, roughly. But China has actual curiosity in being current within the Indian Ocean area. And for those who actually wish to perceive how that is going to play out, it is going to be mandatory to grasp how China presents itself as a maritime energy, presents itself as a world energy, the way it talks about sea lanes of safety, sea strains of communications, and projecting sea strains of communications and choke factors and its power transits. The competitors with India, competitors with U.S., is a byproduct of this actual curiosity, which ties itself in direction of its engagements with Africa, with Middle East, its securing power, and its engagements with Europe and the island states.

Regardless of this competitors China might be within the Indian Ocean area it doesn’t matter what occurs till and until they resolve to not be a world energy, not be a maritime energy.

So, it from the point of view or the lens of India-China competitors doesn’t give us the solutions or the long-term predictability of the developments of the place this is likely to be headed to. Because I really assume that India query has come up as China has sought to raised handle its engagements within the Indian Ocean area in its personal view, which is essential to turning into maritime energy. Because simply to finish on a reality that’s typically missed due to this continental division of an ocean, is: China has one abroad base anyplace on this planet. It’s within the Indian Ocean area, it’s in Djibouti. Just as a result of it’s in Djibouti, which is the African continent. But it has an Indian Ocean coast. It’s thought to be an Africa growth, and it misses the maritime level of it. But China’s engagement throughout the Indian Ocean area is one thing that can proceed to be sustained and engaged. And I believe the parable is that it was all about competing and countering India, and it’s a byproduct of really its bigger ambitions.

MADAN: This level about China’s presence was additionally made by one in every of our earlier audio system, retired Admiral Karambir Singh. He additionally made the purpose that it’s not a lot China’s presence that ought to be the supply of commentary, however its conduct within the area.

And that we’ll additionally watch and see how nations within the area, as their debt reimbursement obligations come up and because the calls for from Beijing come as effectively, do they begin to see China another way as effectively? With that, thanks Constantino Xavier, and thanks Darshana Baruah as effectively.

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MADAN: Thank you for tuning in to the Global India podcast. I’m Tanvi Madan, senior fellow within the Foreign Policy program on the Brookings Institution. You can discover analysis about India and extra episodes of this present on our web site, Brookings dot edu slash Global India.

Global India is delivered to you by the Brookings Podcast Network, and we’ll be releasing new episodes each two weeks. Send any suggestions or inquiries to podcasts at Brookings dot edu.

My because of the manufacturing crew, together with Kuwilileni Hauwanga, supervising producer; Fred Dews and Raman Preet Kaur, producers; Gastón Reboredo, audio engineer; and Daniel Morales, video editor.

My thanks additionally to Alexandra Dimsdale and Hanna Foreman for his or her help, and to Shavanthi Mendis, who designed the present artwork. Additional help for the podcast comes from my colleagues within the Foreign Policy program and the Office of Communications at Brookings.