In July 2017, Indonesia made a diplomatic transfer that would have made China proud in some a part of the multiverse: Jakarta renamed a part of the South China Sea (SCS) — throughout the Indonesian unique financial zone however claimed by Beijing — because the North Natuna Sea.

The renamed maritime space is situated north of the Natuna Islands on the southern finish of the SCS however inside China’s “nine dash line”.

The “nine dash line” is an internationally contested demarcation, which Beijing brandishes to put sweeping claims to virtually the complete resource-rich SCS: According to estimates, greater than 80% of it.

China’s response to Jakarta’s transfer was terse.

“The so-called change of name makes no sense at all and is not conducive to the effort to the international standardisation of the name of places,” Geng Shuang, then Chinese international ministry spokesperson, responded in Beijing, indicating that the change may affect “the current hard-won sound situation in the SCS”.

It “…makes no sense at all..” Really?

Three months earlier, a fuming China had renamed a number of locations in Arunachal Pradesh (AP) — which Beijing claims is South Tibet or “Zangnan” in Chinese — on its map, a day after Tibetan religious chief, the Dalai Lama, concluded his go to to the northeastern Indian state.

The announcement was made on April 13, 2017, following a nine-day high-profile go to to AP by the Dalai Lama.

Since then, Beijing has carried out the identical twice extra within the Indian state: Once in December 2021, and most lately, earlier this month.

The 2017 announcement included six Arunachal areas whereas the second batch in 2021 comprised 15 areas.

This time, China’s ministry of civil affairs launched the modified names in addition to exact geographical coordinates of the 11 locations in early April.

It included two residential areas, 5 mountain peaks, and two rivers in AP and likewise listed the executive districts, the state-run tabloid Global Times reported on April 3.

“Looking at the list of 11 places, most of them are unknown or remote areas. Three are close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) — namely Pangchen, a village in the Zimithang Circle which has a historical background during the 1962 border war with China; then Chakmutse Gangri, near Taksing in Upper Subansiri and finally Goyul Thang, a tiny flat ground near Kaho on the river Lohit,” Claude Arpi, India-based Tibet knowledgeable wrote on his weblog which he additionally shared with HT.

“Except for Pangchen village, these places are small and unknown even to most Arunachalis,” Arpi wrote.

A chart in Chinese characters, Tibetan and Pinyin transliteration of the 11 new names was launched “in accordance with regulations on geographical names issued by the State Council”, China’s cupboard of ministries.

“This is not the first time China has made such an attempt. We reject this outright,” Arindam Bagchi, exterior affairs ministry spokesperson mentioned in New Delhi.

“AP is an integral, inalienable part of India. And attempts to assign invented names will not alter this reality,” he added.

What prompted China to rename locations in AP this time? At least two instant causes appear doubtless in addition to Beijing’s steady makes an attempt to claim sovereignty in disputed areas.

One, the announcement was made days earlier than dwelling minister Amit Shah visited the state to inaugurate the “Vibrant Villages Programme” (VVP).

The VVP, with a monetary allocation of ₹4,800 crore from 2022-23 to 2025-26 will present funds for “…development of essential infrastructure and creation of livelihood opportunities in 19 Districts and 46 Border blocks (in) 4 states and 1 UT (union territory) along the northern land border of the country,” the Press Information Bureau (PIB) had then mentioned in a press release.

In the primary part, 663 villages had been a part of the programme.

China’s choice appeared to be immediately linked to the VVP, an effort by New Delhi to match Beijing’s fast growth of its villages underneath the “Xiaokang” (reasonably affluent) scheme to modernise villages alongside the border.

The second motive might be that it was Beijing’s offended response to Washington recognising the McMahon Line because the worldwide boundary between India and China — a demarcation that Beijing has by no means acknowledged — and likewise placing it on report that AP is an integral a part of India in March.

“This bipartisan resolution expresses the (US) Senate’s support for unequivocally recognising the state of Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India, condemning China’s military aggression to change the status quo along the Line of Actual Control, and further enhancing the US-India strategic partnership and the Quad in support of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Senator Bill Hagerty who together with Senator Jeff Merkley launched the decision within the Senate mentioned in March.

The identify modifications had been “a timely countermeasure against US’s recognition of the McMahon Line as the international boundary between China and India, as well as a major action to undermine India’s illegal territorial claims over the ‘South Tibet’,” Nian Peng, director of Haikou-based Research Centre for Asian Studies (RCAS), mentioned.

“It could consolidate national sovereignty and enhance the administrative jurisdiction of the disputed territories controlled by China. It could also strengthen the PLA’s (China’s People’s Liberation Army) military deployment along the Line of Actual Control,” Nian mentioned.

Renaming locations abroad as a “countermeasure” in opposition to a 3rd nation or assuming that renaming locations in a contested area may “consolidate national sovereignty” could seem meaningless.

Why then does China do it in any respect whether or not in Arunachal, or the SCS, and even in Russia, the place it lately standardised names of eight cities in Chinese together with the identify of Vladivostok?

Bill Hayton, affiliate fellow on the Chatham House Asia-Pacific programme and writer of books on China and Vietnam, mentioned the apply of renaming locations in disputed areas is an effort to “inculcate a sense of anxiety about the perceived loss of territory”.

“This dates back at least to the 1920s. Much of these claims are specious and demonstrate some misunderstandings of East Asian history. These misunderstandings have left a dangerous legacy in the modern era,” Hayton mentioned.

Now, China tries to claim territorial claims in no matter manner they will, Hayton mentioned including: “Renaming disputed features or naming unnamed features in disputed areas has become common in the SCS.”

China claims practically the complete SCS however is locked in a dispute over the possession of islands and reefs with a number of maritime neighbours together with the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia in addition to Vietnam and Taiwan (which Beijing says is a breakaway area.)

In 2020, for instance, China gave names to 80 geographical options within the disputed SCS together with options within the Paracel and Spratly islands; these embody 25 islands, shoals and reefs and 55 oceanic mountains and ridges.

The final such train was carried out in 1983, when China named 287 options within the space.

“It seems to be a way that Chinese officials can appear to be doing something to support China’s territorial claims. In reality, it’s a meaningless gesture but it makes them feel good,” Hayton mentioned.

Meanwhile, life goes on as regular in Indonesia’s North Natuna Sea.

In January this yr, Jakarta deployed a warship, maritime patrol plane and drone to observe a Chinese coast guard vessel within the area, Laksamana Madya Muhammad Ali, Indonesian navy chief, instructed Reuters.

Not simply any coast guard vessel however the CCG 5901, the world’s largest coast guard vessel, dubbed, in line with stories, “the monster”.

The renaming was a bit pointless, Jakarta should have realised.

Sutirtho Patranobis, HT’s skilled China hand, writes a weekly column from Beijing, solely for HT Premium readers. He was beforehand posted in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the place he lined the ultimate part of the civil struggle and its aftermath, and was primarily based in Delhi for a number of years earlier than that

The views expressed are private