When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made an look on the G-7 summit final month in Hiroshima, Japan, he might have been confused by what he heard from one world chief particularly. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “is a big issue in the world,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi mentioned. “I will do whatever we can for the resolution of war.”

When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made an look on the G-7 summit final month in Hiroshima, Japan, he might have been confused by what he heard from one world chief particularly. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “is a big issue in the world,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi mentioned. “I will do whatever we can for the resolution of war.”

Modi’s phrases might simply have been these of a frontrunner whose nation had taken an energetic half in Western sanctions on Russia. But New Delhi’s actions over the previous 12 months and a half inform a unique story. India has dramatically elevated its imports of Russian oil: In December 2022 alone, it bought 33 occasions greater than it had the December prior. And although India has diversified its arms suppliers in latest a long time, it continues to rely closely on Russia for weapons and spare elements. In implementing these selections, New Delhi has proven little curiosity in hewing to Western coverage: This spring, for instance, it reportedly bought Russian oil at above the U.S.-brokered value cap, which was supposed to scale back income to Russia.

New Delhi’s assist for Moscow has manifested diplomatically in addition to economically. India has abstained from votes censuring Russia on the United Nations. Last month, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s exterior affairs minister, met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) assembly in Goa, India. A Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry assertion hailed the “specially privileged strategic partnership between our countries,” whereas Jaishankar tweeted his appreciation for Russia’s assist of India’s SCO presidency.

India’s overseas coverage issues, maybe greater than in earlier years. In addition to holdingthe SCO presidency, India assumed the G-20 presidency in 2023 and has used its platform to declare itself the West’s bridge to the worldwide south. But whereas New Delhi has positioned itself as an more and more essential world energy, the battle in Ukraine has highlighted clear variations not solely between Indian, Russian, and U.S. pursuits, but additionally in how the three international locations outline the very idea of world management.

Russian officers, in the meantime, typically communicate of not desirous to be part of a Western-led liberal worldwide order. “The Russian conception now is to strive toward a multipolar world,” mentioned Sergey Radchenko, a professor on the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. One method for Russia to realize this purpose, Radchenko mentioned, was by elevating the standing of some international locations and decreasing the standing of others—particularly, the United States. (Others have argued that Russia’s imaginative and prescient is of not solely a multipolar world, however one that’s antagonistic towards liberal democracy. John Tefft, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, traces this imaginative and prescient to 2012, when Vladimir Putin returned to the Russian presidency and imposed a want to advertise autocracy on Moscow’s overseas coverage.)

If the United States and Russia bookend two ends of a spectrum on democracy, what does it imply for international locations which have historically shunned aligning with nice powers? It will depend on the place they’re of their trajectories. Scholars in India, for instance, level to a rising self-confidence in New Delhi’s overseas coverage that stems from its rising financial clout. “The fact that the United States and other partners are willing to accept that India won’t openly criticize Russia demonstrates that the world has accepted India’s vision of its being a global power and is comfortable with that,” mentioned Aparna Pande, the director of the India Initiative on the Hudson Institute.

It could appear that the United States, Russia, and India every have contrasting visions of how the worldwide order ought to run. But there are at the least some areas of overlap between every nation’s overseas coverage. “Geography matters,” mentioned Nandan Unnikrishnan, distinguished fellow on the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation, the place he leads the Eurasia Program of Studies. “Where you sit is how you see the world.”

India would love extra of a say in Western-led organizations such because the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations—significantly the U.N. Security Council, the place New Delhi has lengthy coveted a seat. And that signifies that when it appears on the globe, Unnikrishnan mentioned, “India is not against the world order being rocked a little bit.”

Lavrov, for his half, has repeatedly lauded India as a key companion in an rising multipolar order. But regardless of Moscow’s finest hopes, India and Russia will not be in lockstep both.

“We definitely don’t see the world as Moscow does,” Unnikrishnan mentioned. In half, that’s as a result of India has benefited economically from the rules-based liberal worldwide order, changing into a rising vacation spot for Western enterprise. While New Delhi might even see decreasing the extent of U.S. hegemony in its curiosity, it doesn’t see itself locked in an existential battle with the United States as Russia does.

Instead, there’s substantial symmetry between the United States and India right this moment, in keeping with Rudra Chaudhuri, the director of Carnegie India. “India’s not a country designed to follow one pole or the other,” he mentioned. “Indian interests globally will at some level complement those of the United States,” he added, pointing to the potential for elevated financial and technological ties.

While Moscow, New Delhi, and Washington every have various visions of their place on the planet, Russia’s battle in Ukraine has revealed uncomfortable frictions between them, particularly for India.

One of the driving motivations of the present Indian authorities, Unnikrishnan mentioned, is to raise folks out of poverty. “This economic project is under strain not so much because of Russia’s war on Ukraine, but sanctions,” he mentioned. New Delhi now faces the specter of secondary sanctions from Washington, which may very well be a significant irritant within the U.S.-India relationship. And if Western sanctions on Russia have their supposed impact, it might additionally make issues harder for India past the economic system, since India continues to depend on Russia for spare navy elements. Perhaps realizing this, Moscow is reportedly pressuring New Delhi to assist Russia avoid being blacklisted at a Financial Action Task Force assembly later this month.

A second complicating issue is the problem of sovereignty. The United States has made a refined shift from underscoring the significance of democracy to framing the battle in Ukraine as a check for the power of worldwide borders—a problem New Delhi cares about significantly. India has a disputed border with China and has lately misplaced a number of kilometers of territory to Beijing—a incontrovertible fact that leaders in New Delhi have prevented acknowledging in public.

Many within the Indian policymaking neighborhood have lengthy mentioned that India must work with Russia to keep away from shedding Moscow to Beijing. But the battle has made Russia extra depending on China, and thus much less empowered to problem both it or the United States.

Modi’s message to Zelensky on the G-7, then, wasn’t flawed. The Russia-Ukraine battle is a matter for the remainder of the world, simply not within the sense Biden and Zelensky take into consideration. The destiny of India’s new multipolar world order might properly depend upon it.