A U.S. Army soldier throughout an India-US joint train or “Yudh Abhyas, in Auli, ttarakhand, near the disputed border with China
| Photo Credit: AP

If principal contradictions should decide strategic priorities, New Delhi ought to resolve what its principal contradiction is. The idea of a principal contradiction — one which poses essentially the most intense problem to a person/organisation, and has the facility to form its future selections and consequent outcomes — is a helpful technique of optimising and prioritising strategic decision-making. Whether or not Indian policymakers articulate it as such, China is modern India’s principal strategic contradiction. Every different problem, be it Pakistan, inner insurgencies, and difficulties in relations with its neighbours, fall within the class of secondary contradictions.

If so, I’d argue that main selections in New Delhi’s strategic resolution matrix ought to go the China take a look at, which quantities to asking and answering a moderately simple query: “does x or y decision/development/relationship help deal with the China challenge, or not?” Decision-makers should then view the choice/growth/relationship within the mild of this reply. It is just not that secondary contradictions will not be essential or that they don’t add to the first contradiction. A perspicacious ‘China test’ may help prioritise strategic resolution making within the longer run, at the least as an analytical instrument with potential coverage utility.

From an operational viewpoint, the ‘China test’ consists of three distinct parts. First, an evaluation of how a sure Indian resolution or a selected regional growth squares with Chinese regional technique or pursuits. Second, an evaluation of whether or not India’s resolution or a sure regional growth would require India to make modifications on the stage of secondary contradictions. And third, an evaluation of whether or not this could require any main coverage modifications internally. Let me spotlight the utility of the ‘China test’ utilizing a couple of examples.

India-U.S. relations

New Delhi has had a sophisticated relationship with Washington which is more and more getting normalised and interests-driven. Despite its withdrawal from the area, Washington is searching for to re-engage southern Asia (Pakistan, South Asia typically, the Indo-Pacific, and maybe even the Taliban). It seems that one of many classes New Delhi learnt from the standoff with China alongside the Line of Actual Control in 2020 was that it was maybe a consequence of India’s rising proximity to the U.S. If so, ought to New Delhi mood its relations with the U.S., significantly within the Indo-Pacific, within the hope that it will maintain Beijing’s aggression at bay? Or, ought to India proceed the strategic partnership with the U.S. no matter what China thinks about it?

What would a ‘China test’ of India-U.S. relations recommend? Given that Beijing seeks to dominate the area, it’s clearly not in its curiosity to see an American reengagement of the area or rising India-U.S. proximity. If so, the shortage of/lukewarm India-U.S. strategic engagement within the area is exactly what would assist Beijing’s long-term targets. A China take a look at would recommend that New Delhi shouldn’t give into the short-term temptation of not being on the fallacious facet of China given its long-term implications. While the fears of such a relationship irking China might not be solely unjustified, they invariably play into the Chinese technique of boxing India within the area.

Does the China take a look at require India to pacify its relationship with Pakistan? Let us ask ourselves the query: “does making (relative) peace with Pakistan help India better deal with China?” The reply, for my part, is a powerful sure. Imagine this. For China, the best-case state of affairs is an India vigorously preoccupied with Pakistan which ensures that India is just not targeted on the rising menace from China, thereby offering Beijing with the chance to displace conventional Indian primacy in South Asia. So, for India, a course-correction on Pakistan, even when it’s only put up facto, is a strategically wise one.

Let me put that considerably in another way. What India ought to actively search is just not a stability of energy in South Asia with Pakistan however balancing Chinese energy in Southern Asia. Hence, India’s goal in South Asia ought to be to hunt a pacification of conflicts with Pakistan, in order that it will possibly deal with China. Similarly, India needn’t oppose the American engagement of Pakistan for a similar cause — it helps stop Pakistan from going into the China camp fully. A Pakistan engaged with the U.S. and the West is best for India than a Pakistan shunned by the U.S. and the West.

The Russia connection

India-Russia relations within the wake of the Ukraine warfare are among the many most debated bilateral relationships on the earth at this time. Let us apply the China take a look at to look at the logic behind India-Russia relations within the face of western stress on India to decouple from Moscow. “Does continuing its relationship with Moscow help New Delhi better deal with the China challenge?”

The reply might not be an easy one, however the China take a look at does present a solution. The U.S. and its allies would really like India to cease participating with Moscow and condemn its aggression towards Ukraine — which India has refused to take action far. In return, there may be on provide higher lodging of Indian pursuits together with maybe diplomatic and political help towards Chinese aggression. There can be the rising proximity between Moscow and Beijing which reduces the robustness of India-Russia relations. So, does the China take a look at require New Delhi to proceed to have interaction with Moscow towards all these odds? While I’m personally satisfied that India-Russia relations are on the wane, there’s a robust rationale for New Delhi to proceed its relationship with Moscow — which is China.

Consider this. If certainly New Delhi was to fully break free from Russia (as India’s U.S. and western companions have requested India to), what can be the possible penalties of such a choice? Such a choice is more than likely to play into China’s fingers. For one, within the absence of an India-Russia relationship, the extent of Sino-Russian cooperation is more likely to strengthen, and India can be reduce out of the continental house to its north and west. Second, New Delhi continues to get discounted power, cheaper defence gear (even when a few of it must be retrofitted with extra refined know-how from elsewhere), help on the United Nations Security Council, and Moscow has been understanding of New Delhi’s ‘political sensitivities’ greater than its western companions. If India decides to interrupt away from Russia, many of those may come to a grinding halt, and the pure beneficiary of such an eventuality will, undoubtedly, be China. This may additionally push Moscow in the direction of Pakistan with or with out some nudging from Beijing.

It can be essential to notice that Moscow is just not eager to have China dominate the strategic house round it and has been eager to stability the rising affect of China in Central Asia with companions resembling New Delhi. New Delhi’s flip away from Moscow will be sure that China will get a free hand in Central Asia too. In one sense, due to this fact, the China piece greatest explains the enigma referred to as India-Russia relations.

For New Delhi, the message from the China take a look at is a moderately simple one — good balancing China in Southern Asia and past should kind a key ingredient in India’s grand strategic planning and resolution making.

Happymon Jacob teaches on the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and is the founding father of Council for Strategic and Defence Research.