India is festooned for the season’s finale: the G20 summit. On 9–10 September, G20 leaders (at least most) might be in New Delhi to debate issues that plague our planet. Organising the summit of a bunch that represents 85 per cent of world GDP, 75 per cent of world commerce, and two-thirds of the world inhabitants is being made a giant deal in India. An opportunity for India to shine.

Set in opposition to the backdrop of grinding great-power politics, the G20 summit in New Delhi is unlikely to supply grand outcomes. Animosity and mutual suspicion between main powers are components past India’s management. So tempering expectations is cheap.

But for India itself, a flip on the G20 presidency has been symbolic of New Delhi’s rising self-confidence. The spectacle is aimed toward inside consumption – to point out the transition from a beleaguered post-colonial society to a severe geopolitical participant. Experts have called India the weakest of the key powers and the strongest among the many center powers. In different phrases, New Delhi’s G20 presidency is about reinforcing India’s self-belief about its personal financial and geopolitical potential.

In that context, one query repeatedly pops up: the place does India actually stand? And the usually unstated connotation is asking India to decide on between Washington and its allies or the Eurasian alliance of Beijing and Moscow. After all, India is part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue on one hand and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS on the opposite.

India’s major concern is a China-dominated unipolar Asia.

The obvious contradiction between the Quad and SCO/BRICS doesn’t exist within the minds of policymakers in New Delhi. All main powers have interaction different powers and don’t break off ties with anybody. Call this strategy what you want, “multi-alignment” or “omnidirectional”, however the actuality stays the identical. As one retired Indian diplomat put it, “Showing that we are getting cosy with the Americans is better than completely aligning with Washington. It could help tease out concessions from Beijing.”

Some may argue that given China’s latest adventurism in releasing a new map displaying Indian territories as its personal, attempting to tease concessions from Beijing isn’t taking India far. Given India’s historic beef with China over a disputed border, structural contradictions between the 2 Asian giants are prone to persist within the foreseeable future.

Coming again to India’s all-sided engagement, we should separate rhetoric from actuality. India’s participation within the SCO and BRICS isn’t due to a direct convergence of pursuits – as a substitute it’s holding a foot within the door. An elementary case of a lot speak, little present. The strategic adhesive that earlier certain India to those nations – anxiousness over Washington’s unipolar second within the case of the BRICS – now not constrains New Delhi. India’s major concern is a China-dominated unipolar Asia.

Moreover, New Delhi doesn’t wish to pave the way in which for Beijing to rule the roost within the SCO and BRICS by withdrawing. The SCO and BRICS additionally serve two different functions. One is to assist broaden India’s outreach to the nations of the “Global South”. New Delhi is positioning itself as a bridge between the developed and the creating world. Given the belief deficit between the G7 and G77, India seeks to be the connecting hyperlink between the 2 our bodies. Indian exterior affairs minister S. Jaishankar manufacturers India as a “South Western” energy. In different phrases, reconciling Western pursuits with the developmental agenda of the Global South is the function New Delhi is getting ready itself for.

These boards additionally present impartial grounds for heads of state to satisfy their counterparts. For instance, the lately held BRICS summit in Johannesburg allowed direct communication between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Yet India’s engagement with Washington and its allies, corresponding to Australia and Japan, has additionally grown manifold in the previous couple of years. Minilaterals such because the Quad are filled with problems with mutual curiosity. Themes protecting maritime area consciousness, essential and rising applied sciences, cybersecurity, maritime safety and anti-piracy are constructing blocks of higher strategic belief between India and “like-minded” nations. Again, the nomenclature may differ from “like-minded coalitions” to “limited liability partnerships”, however the essence stays the identical.

India wants the United States and its allies for 2 main causes. The most blatant one is to kind issue-based balancing coalitions to safe a multipolar Asia – by rising the prices for any misadventure by any energy. As Bismarck would say, balancing is achieved by making a “nightmare of coalitions”. The second want is for India’s home transformation – transitioning from a low-income society to the next per-capita economic system. Western expertise and capital are indispensable on this regard.

Like lots of its counterparts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, India is courting many suitors on the similar time. Therefore, speaking with the Eurasian powers and performing within the different course is part of the identical recreation.