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One of the hallmarks of the 1965 India-Pakistan battle was the improvisations led to by the Western Army Commander Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh and General Officer Commanding (GOC) 11 Corps Lt Gen JS Dhillon to cope with rising operational conditions.
Among the numerous that had been applied, some had been very profitable just like the Bharat Force and Megh Force, whereas different spur-of-the-moment choices of the Army Commander had poor outcomes such because the capitulation of 4 Sikh.
As far as the difficulty of management goes, at a macro degree, the short change of a division commander who did not carry out and the speedy sacking of incompetent commanding officers and brigade commanders within the 1965 battle is unmatched thus far in some other navy operation within the nation.
While the saga of Megh Force and Lt Col Megh Singh is well-known, Bharat Force was the results of a fast resolution taken to interchange the commanding officer of an armoured regiment. Taking benefit of this alteration in command, an ad-hoc armoured activity power was created which was fairly profitable however may have yielded much more outcomes with extra drive and innovation.
The official historical past of the battle notes that on September 11, 1965, when a significant enemy armour and infantry risk was reported growing on the Ranian axis, close to Amritsar, 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was moved into the 15 Division sector on the intervening evening of September 11 and 12. However, the Brigade moved again to the 4 Mountain Division sector on September 13 after the scenario was stabilised.
On September 11, the Commandant of an armoured regiment was changed by Colonel Bharat Singh after sure orders issued by the Commandant concerning contact with enemy Patton tanks had been seen dimly by senior officers.
Regarding Col Bharat Singh, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh wrote in his ebook In The Line of Duty, that Colonel Bharat Singh was Colonel A at his headquarters at Simla. He provides that it was the primary day of the battle when he bought a report that the Commandant of an armoured regiment with the 15 Infantry Division “had not been well” and because of this, he had issued an order to his tank regiment in writing, to not take their tanks nearer than 2,000 yards as much as the Ichhogil Canal.
The Commandant warned in his orders that the Pakistanis had Patton tanks, which had higher vary and a greater calibre of gun in comparison with the Shermans which his regiment possessed.
“I intended to replace this officer when Colonel Bharat Singh trooped into my office and volunteered to go and take over the regiment which he had commanded once. I considered his rank of a full Colonel, and also thought of the five AMX tanks (brand new) which had been left behind by the Pakistanis, in their foolish dash over the Dera Baba Nanak bridge. I offered to send him as a Force Commander of the armour in the area of the GT Axis, including 1 Horse and the 5 AMX tanks belonging to the enemy, provided he found the crew for them from 1 Horse. He was to lead his tanks himself right up to the Ichhogil Canal,” writes Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh.
Another impromptu resolution taken by the Army Commander was about Brigadier Pritam Singh. Again, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh mentions that the officer was below a cloud and was lined as much as be demoted to his substantive rank of Lieutenant Colonel simply earlier than the battle commenced.
“I was worried about who would replace the Brigadier in charge of Dera Baba Nanak, who during a local exercise had stumbled into one of our own bunkers and broken his back. I recalled my meeting with Pritam Singh at Dera Baba Nanak, way back in the 1950s, when I was Brigadier General Staff Western Command and he was commanding a Guards battalion there,” writes Harbaksh Singh.
“He had at the time explained the layout of the sector of Dera Baba Nanak to me. So, I sent for him and explained that I was willing to keep him in his present rank of Brigadier if he would go and take over the Dera Baba Nanak bridge. He was only too happy to do so. And though he did not particularly distinguish himself there, and retired from the Army as a Brigadier, I had the satisfaction of having helped an acquaintance,” he provides.
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In truth at Dera Baba Nanak, the Army Commander and the Corps Commander, Lt Gen JS Dhillon, needed to make one other impromptu resolution to stabilise the scenario when confronted with a Pakistani push. The Brigade Commander needed to withdraw from the bundh close to the Ravi River and defend at a contemporary defensive position on the Dera Baba Nanak-Batala street.
The Corps Commander forbade this retreat and instantly dispatched Chief Engineer 11 Corps Brigadier Bhide and GSO 1 on the Corps HQ Lt Col Chhaju Ram to the brigade headquarters to assist deal with the growing battle and retake key positions.
In his different ebook War Despatches, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh factors out the significance of excellent management in battle. “The lesson is clear: in war, there can be no substitute for good leadership-the best of plans are doomed to failure without aggressive and enterprising commanders. The retention of the hesitant and cautious in command is an invitation to disaster”.
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