Since the milestone victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) within the 2019 common elections, political observers have been intently watching the Muslim minority’s response within the electoral area. Available knowledge counsel that in subsequent state elections, Muslims have largely voted in opposition to the BJP and in favor of the main challenger social gathering. There are a number of caveats, nevertheless. Alongside this consolidation of the Muslim vote, salient social and political variations inside the Muslim inhabitants have concurrently surfaced. For instance, Muslim caste hierarchies and different sub-identities equivalent to sect have develop into necessary subjects of mainstream political conversations. This truth raises urgent questions for electoral dynamics because the 2024 common election approaches. Should the concept of a coherent Muslim voting bloc be retired? To what extent is caste related to the understanding of Muslim voting habits? Do group-based solidarities round faith and caste exist for Muslims?

A Monolith or a Mosaic?

In standard election analyses, Muslims are sometimes handled as a homogeneous voting bloc. Yet, as Hilal Ahmed’s research factors out, Muslims hardly make up a monolithic neighborhood that mechanically acts in a coordinated style; similar to Hindus, Muslims are divided on class, sect, caste, and regional traces—complicating claims that they behave like a uniform vote financial institution. Prior to 2019, Muslim voting habits was significantly fragmented, and there have been no clear indicators of constituency-level coordination behind a single political social gathering. Notably, nevertheless, voting habits has develop into extra complicated for the reason that BJP’s 2019 victory.

Political scientists sometimes use a measure generally known as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to look at the extent of fractionalization or consolidation that exists within the distribution of votes. An index rating near zero implies that every one Muslims voted for various events, whereas a rating of 1 signifies their help for a similar social gathering. An software of the HHI for the 2019 common elections reveals some fractionalization of Muslim votes, regardless of rising Hindu majoritarianism. In addition, there’s appreciable variation throughout states (see determine 1). This fractionalization is marked when taking a look at Muslim votes each for particular person events and for alliances.

By comparability, research of Muslim voting in state meeting elections for the reason that 2019 common elections and the ushering in of a new dominant party system distinctly present some consolidation. Surveys by the Lokniti Programme for Comparative Democracy on the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies present that within the 2020 Bihar elections, about 77 p.c of Muslims voted for the Mahagathbandhan (an alliance of events against the BJP); within the 2021 West Bengal elections, 75 p.c of Muslims voted for the incumbent Trinamool Congress; and within the 2022 Uttar Pradesh elections, 79 p.c of Muslims voted for the opposition Samajwadi Party.

A spread of things seem to form Muslim voting in state and nationwide elections. Some students counsel that Muslims vote based on a state’s electoral context (based mostly on what number of events are contesting and who these events are) or particular person candidate prospects (with Muslims’ votes divided in multipolar contests). My own research, which focuses on state meeting elections, argues that Muslim voting habits is influenced by the presence (or absence) of a coethnic consultant. I present that the existence of a Muslim consultant can activate inside divisions amongst Muslims that form their subsequent voting habits. These divisions can manifest alongside sub-identities inside the broader Muslim identification.

Caste Within Religion

Despite scholarly inattention, caste stays a related sub-identity within the Muslim neighborhood. While observers largely agree that caste amongst Muslims could not have a non secular or ideological underpinning, it manifests socially and occupationally in a hierarchical form just like caste in Hindu communities. Muslim caste identification is split into three classes: Ashraf, Ajlaf, and Arzal. The Ashraf are self-proclaimed descendants of Muslim immigrants who emigrated to the Indian subcontinent from the Middle East and Central Asia; the group contains Sayyids, Shaikhs, Mughals, and Pathans, who all have totally different hierarchical positions inside the class. The Ajlaf and Arzal are primarily Hindus who transformed to Islam and correspond to Backward Class (OBC) and Dalit subcastes, respectively. Dalit Muslims, nevertheless, don’t profit from affirmative motion protections that exist for Scheduled Castes beneath the Constitution of India. Since the Nineties, activists amongst non-Ashraf Muslims—Ajlaf (OBC) and Arzal (Dalit) Muslims—have sought to mobilize in opposition to Ashraf dominance in politics and have begun to discuss with themselves collectively as Pasmanda (a Persian time period which means “those left behind”). Today, “Pasmanda Muslims” is used as an umbrella term for OBC and Dalit Muslims.

Research reveals that some Muslims nonetheless expertise practices of untouchability which can be additionally noticed in Hindu communities. For instance, throughout a survey on caste amongst Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, some Dalits reported repeatedly encountering situations of untouchability, equivalent to not being permitted to bury their lifeless in the identical graveyard as upper-caste neighbors or their youngsters being seated individually throughout meals at college. They additionally reported going through untouchability in interactions with each upper-caste Muslims and Hindus. Moreover, the survey responses of non-Dalit Muslims indicated that they have interaction in practices of untouchability to varied extents; for instance, 21 p.c of non-Dalit Muslims reported that they don’t go to the houses of Dalit Muslims. 

The 2006 Sachar Committee Report revealed by India’s Ministry of Minority Affairs is commonly cited to spotlight the tutorial and financial variations between Muslims and Hindus, nevertheless it additionally examines variations inside the Muslim inhabitants, particularly alongside caste traces.¹ Grouping non-upper-caste Muslims into the OBC Muslim class, the report compares OBC Muslims to General Muslims and OBC Hindus. In the domains of training, employment, and financial standing, Muslim OBCs fared poorly relative to each General Muslims and Hindu OBCs. (In the report’s groupings, “General Muslims” are those that fall within the Ashraf class, whereas OBC Muslims embody the Ajlaf and Arzal, who represent the Pasmanda class.)

Politicization of Muslim Caste Identity

In addition to being related to the socioeconomic lives of Muslims, caste is more and more changing into a part of conversations on politics and group relations. This is evidenced by, as an example, the sharp rise in Google searches for the time period “Pasmanda” in India over the previous 4 years (see determine 2). This rise is most outstanding in North India, which has additionally witnessed essentially the most public mobilization of Pasmanda identification.

In phrases of civic life, there’s growing evidence of Muslim caste-based mobilization. For occasion, one mobilizing drive on the heart of the Pasmanda motion is the All-India Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz (AIPMM) group. The AIPMM, based mostly in Bihar and led by former Rajya Sabha parliamentary member Ali Anwar, has been on the forefront of civic efforts to advocate for Dalit Muslims (in addition to Dalit Christians) to have Scheduled Caste standing, which permits for affirmative motion in authorities jobs, training, and politics and authorized safety in opposition to atrocities.

Over the previous a number of years, political elites have additionally been increasing their efforts to mobilize Muslims alongside caste traces. While most of this mobilization is predicated on the umbrella “Pasmanda” grouping, there’s some proof of mobilization of the Ansari subcaste in Bihar. In the lead-up to the 2020 Bihar state elections, the Ansari Mahapanchayat (AMP) advocacy group was formed and engaged in grassroots organizing within the central and western elements of the state, arguing particularly for elected illustration for Ansaris. However, ultimately, the group’s management fractured, with prime officers throwing their help behind totally different alliances on the state degree.

Perhaps essentially the most outstanding consideration given to the Pasmanda grouping surprisingly got here from the BJP throughout its 2022 nationwide government assembly in Telangana’s capital metropolis Hyderabad. In truth, the aforementioned Google Trends for the time period Pasmanda reached its ten-year peak in the identical month because the occasion. Despite his social gathering’s Hindu nationalist bona fides, Prime Minister Narendra Modi urged BJP employees to succeed in out to Pasmanda Muslims. Modi subsequently held a number of occasions with notable Pasmanda Muslims later within the 12 months. While these conferences had been the social gathering’s first large-scale public outreach effort, it has engaged with Pasmanda Muslims previously. For occasion, sociologist Khalid Anis Ansari famous that in 2013 in Uttar Pradesh, the BJP shaped a “weavers’ cell” to interact some Pasmanda Muslims, and in 2017 in Odisha, the social gathering highlighted the necessity for Pasmanda Muslims to obtain the identical advantages as OBCs and even known as out Sayyids and Pathans for “usurping welfare measures.”

Nevertheless, the BJP’s express outreach in 2022 was not solely nicely acquired. Several Muslim teams warned members of the Pasmanda neighborhood to be cautious of the social gathering’s outreach. For occasion, the AIPMM emphasised that no political social gathering ought to take the help of Pasmanda Muslims without any consideration, whereas the group’s chief, Anwar, personally criticized the social gathering’s Pasmanda outreach by underscoring that Pasmanda Muslims have been disproportionately affected throughout communal assaults. Asaduddin Owaisi, the chief of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen social gathering—which repeatedly evokes Muslim solidarity—also lambasted the BJP’s outreach, highlighting that Pasmanda Muslims have been victims of vigilante violence beneath the present BJP authorities.

Results of the BJP’s outreach have been blended. The social gathering fielded four Pasmanda Muslims within the Delhi Municipal Corporation elections in December 2022, however not one of the candidates gained and just one got here shut as a runner-up. However, the outcomes of the May 2023 Uttar Pradesh by-elections within the metropolis of Suar counsel that the social gathering’s efforts may have gained some traction. After Abdullah Azam Khan, a consultant of Suar on the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly, was sentenced to prison, by-elections had been held within the metropolis, the place Muslims represent round 60 percent of the inhabitants. The Apna Dal (Sonelal) social gathering, a regional companion of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance, fielded a Pasmanda Muslim, Shafeek Ahmed Ansari, with the backing of the BJP. Ansari in the end defeated the opposition Samajwadi Party candidate, with key BJP leaders claiming that Ansari’s win was a direct results of the social gathering’s efforts to mobilize the Pasmanda Muslim vote. However, as a result of it was a Muslim candidate from Apna Dal contesting in opposition to a Hindu candidate from the Samajwadi Party, it’s exhausting to discern whether or not caste or faith performed the larger function.

Contours of Pasmanda Political Behavior

While Pasmanda politics has figured extra prominently in mainstream political mobilization in recent times, the neighborhood’s voting habits is much less clear. Understanding the heterogeneity in political habits inside the Muslim inhabitants stays troublesome for 2 causes. First, most surveys search to seize a consultant pattern of India or a specific Indian state, which limits the pattern of Muslim respondents. Second, they usually don’t seize particulars on Muslim castes. To assist handle these limitations, I performed a survey of almost 2,000 Muslims in Uttar Pradesh in 2022, with a specific concentrate on the contours of political habits inside the Muslim neighborhood.² The survey was additionally performed with virtually 2,000 Hindus in Uttar Pradesh in 2022 to permit for comparisons throughout spiritual teams.

When requested about state elections in Uttar Pradesh in 2012, a small proportion of Muslim voters reported that they voted for the BJP candidate. By 2017, 12.6 p.c of General Muslims and eight p.c of Pasmanda Muslims reported help for the BJP. Interestingly, by the 2022 state elections BJP help amongst General Muslims fell to 9.8 p.c whereas help amongst Pasmanda Muslims elevated barely to 9.1 p.c. While vote alternative in state elections doesn’t mechanically translate to habits in nationwide elections, the BJP’s current inroads with the Pasmanda neighborhood—together with focused 2024 election outreach (for instance, by enlisting “Modi Mitrs” or buddies of Modi)—means that elevated Pasmanda help for the BJP is solely potential. But when this outreach happens alongside efforts to mobilize Hindus on their collective spiritual identification, voting for the BJP can develop into a tough promote for Muslims, no matter caste.

While the broader dialog about caste hierarchies amongst Muslims means that people could consider their caste when it comes to the broader classes of Pasmanda and General, the 2022 survey in Uttar Pradesh—and the aforementioned Ansari-specific mobilization in Bihar—counsel that Muslims might imagine extra when it comes to their subcaste. When requested within the survey whether or not a respondent agreed with the assertion, “In an election, it is important for members of the same jati [subcaste] to vote for the same party,” 43 p.c of General Muslims agreed with the assertion, in comparison with 53 p.c of Pasmanda Muslims.³ This latter proportion can be greater than the share of Hindu respondents who agreed with the assertion; 34 p.c of General Hindus, 37 p.c of Scheduled Caste Hindus, and 41 p.c of OBC Hindus reported that it was necessary for members of the identical subcaste to vote as a bloc. If the BJP can acquire floor with the Pasmanda neighborhood, there may very well be far-reaching penalties given heightened perceptions that caste-based coordination is necessary. As nationwide elections method, the extent to which Pasmanda Muslims view the BJP’s outreach as honest (or not) must be tracked.

Caste Versus Religion

The elevated relevance of caste to Indian politics raises questions on how a lot solidarity Muslims have with members of their superordinate identification (spiritual group) in comparison with their subordinate identification (subcaste group). Scholars of race and ethnic politics throughout contexts usually use measures of “linked fate” to grasp group-based solidarity and consciousness. These measures search to grasp how a lot a person’s well-being is linked to their group’s well-being. Adapting survey questions usually used within the American context, the 2022 survey in Uttar Pradesh requested Muslim respondents what higher or worse circumstances for his or her subcaste group and their spiritual group would imply for themselves as people (see determine 4).⁴

Muslims usually indicated excessive ranges of linked progress and linked damage based mostly on their caste identification. Around 90 p.c of Muslim respondents perceived that if issues received higher for his or her subcaste, issues would additionally get higher for them individually. And about 72 p.c believed that if issues received worse for his or her subcaste, they’d worsen for them, too. By comparability, Muslims usually indicated excessive ranges of linked progress however fairly low ranges of linked damage based mostly on their spiritual identification. Among all Muslims, caste-based solidarity appeared stronger relative to religion-based solidarity.

Across statements probing each progress and damage, Pasmanda Muslims indicated greater ranges of general linked destiny than General Muslims did, suggesting larger group solidarity. While this understanding of solidarity amongst caste and non secular teams is proscribed to 1 state, it underscores the necessity to incorporate varied Muslim sub-identities into researchers’ mapping of political dynamics. Indeed, sect (one other salient sub-identity) has lengthy formed Muslim political habits in some elements of India equivalent to Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh. In my survey, Shia Muslims in Lucknow exhibited greater ranges of help for the BJP, a sample additionally found in different national-level election surveys. And, at instances, members of the Deobandi and Barelvi sects of Sunni Islam have placed their weight behind conflicting events and candidates in each state and nationwide elections. For instance, my survey revealed that in state elections in Uttar Pradesh, Barelvi Muslims have repeatedly supported the Samajwadi Party at greater charges in comparison with Deobandi Muslims.

Toward the 2024 Elections

Since the 2019 common elections, Muslims have develop into extra more likely to vote in a unified means, however the political salience of caste within the Muslim neighborhood seems to have elevated on the identical time. Thus, within the coming 2024 elections, whereas it nonetheless appears unlikely that Muslims will vote solely on their caste or sect identification, it’s clear that sub-identities will form each campaigning and voting to a point. With the BJP’s mobilization of Pasmanda Muslims gathering steam and with opposition events plotting countermeasures, it will be unwise for political analysts to restrict investigations of caste to the Hindu neighborhood alone. If the BJP is even reasonably profitable in consummating its outreach to Pasmanda Muslims, researchers could must retire the concept of a Muslim voting bloc and pursue a complete, nuanced understanding of how and when sub-identities form Muslim voting habits.

In the months forward, Carnegie students and contributors will probably be analyzing varied dimensions of India’s upcoming election battle—together with the function international coverage performs, the impression of welfare schemes, and the way know-how has reshaped campaigning. Keep updated with the mission here.

Notes

¹ The Sachar Committee was a high-level committee established in March 2005 by the federal government of former prime minister Manmohan Singh of the Indian National Congress (often known as the Congress Party). Headed by former chief justice of the Delhi High Court Rajinder Sachar, it was tasked with learning the social, instructional, and financial standing of India’s Muslim neighborhood. The committee submitted its report back to Parliament in November 2006.

² This survey was carried out by the creator throughout eighteen districts in japanese, central, and western Uttar Pradesh. The pattern included 1,468 Muslims who recognized as Pasmanda (OBC and Dalit) and 480 who recognized as General or Upper Caste. Additionally, the Hindu pattern of the survey included 355 Hindus figuring out as Upper Caste, 1,180 figuring out as OBC, and 389 figuring out as from the Scheduled Castes.

³ Agreeing with the assertion concerned saying that the respondent “strongly agreed” or “agreed.”

⁴ The questions on linked progress and linked damage had been tailored from Jae Yeon Kim and Alan N. Yan, “Unbundling Linked Fate: How Respondents Interpret Linked Fate Question,” SocArXiv, Working Paper, November 15, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/k6c9x.