People maintain flags throughout a Sikh rally exterior the Indian Consulate in Toronto to lift consciousness within the wake of the Canadian prime minister’s feedback alleging Indian authorities brokers had been doubtlessly concerned within the June killing of Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia, on Monday.

Cole Burston /AFP by way of Getty Images

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People maintain flags throughout a Sikh rally exterior the Indian Consulate in Toronto to lift consciousness within the wake of the Canadian prime minister’s feedback alleging Indian authorities brokers had been doubtlessly concerned within the June killing of Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia, on Monday.

Cole Burston /AFP by way of Getty Images

Michael Kugelman is director of the South Asia Institute on the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.

The present India-Canada disaster has uncovered a pointy disconnect between India and the West on the difficulty of Sikh separatism.

Ever since Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau alleged doable Indian involvement within the June assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh separatist chief in British Columbia, New Delhi has doubled down on a long-standing grievance: Canada is residence to harmful anti-India extremists that Ottawa refuses to curb. It is a controversial rivalry, and one which Ottawa has by no means endorsed.

In New Delhi’s view, these anti-India parts are exemplified by Nijjar, a supporter of the Khalistan motion that seeks a separate Sikh homeland in India’s Punjab state. Indian officers accuse Nijjar of heading the Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF), a banned violent group. New Delhi formally categorized him as a terrorist in 2020. Recently leaked Indian intelligence reports declare Nijjar funded terrorism in India and arranged arms coaching camps in Canada.

India’s determination to challenge a brand new travel advisory urging Indians to “exercise utmost caution” in Canada and suspend visa companies for Canadians is supposed to sign that with anti-India parts allegedly working with impunity in Canada, Indians are unsafe there. (On Sunday, Canada issued its personal new travel advisory that warns Canadian residents in India to “stay vigilant and exercise caution.”) On Saturday, Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman Arindam Bagchi referred to Canada’s “growing reputation as a safe haven for terrorists, for extremists, and for organized crime.”

India’s positions on terrorism, particularly Islamist militancy, usually converge with these of Washington and different Western capitals. It’s a unique story with Sikh extremism.

In the fast post-9/11 period, earlier than the China problem grew to become the core driver of U.S.-India cooperation, counterterrorism constituted a key focus of partnership — and particularly after the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, through which gunmen killed 166 folks, together with six Americans. U.S. and Indian officers blame Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-sponsored and India-focused terrorist group, for the assault. After the assaults, Washington ramped up its covert presence in Pakistan, and one among its prime motivations was to gather more information on LeT.

Washington and New Delhi usually see eye to eye on the threats posed by LeT, but in addition by al-Qaida, Jaish-e-Mohammad (one other Pakistani India-focused group) and the Islamic State. Joint statements from conferences between senior American and Indian leaders — together with one after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state go to to Washington in June — usually comprise robust pledges to fight terrorism.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attends a luncheon hosted by U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the State Department in Washington, D.C., on June 23.

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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attends a luncheon hosted by U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the State Department in Washington, D.C., on June 23.

Samuel Corum/AFP by way of Getty Images

However, U.S and different Western officers haven’t categorically condemned violent Sikh separatism. U.S. officers and lawmakers did denounce two actions by pro-Khalistan protesters on the Indian Consulate in San Francisco earlier this 12 months. One was an attempt by pro-Khalistan demonstrators in July to set the consulate on hearth. The different was in March, when separatist demonstrators breached the entry limitations of the identical facility and put in two Khalistan flags on the consulate grounds.

They have not endorsed New Delhi’s categorization of Nijjar as a terrorist (Indian press reviews claim Nijjar was on a U.S. no-fly record, however Washington hasn’t confirmed this). Washington hasn’t formally designated any violent Khalistan teams as terrorist organizations — although it did designate one other South Asian separatist outfit, the Baluchistan Liberation Army in Pakistan, in 2019.

Several causes could clarify why India’s warnings in regards to the risks of Sikh separatism have not galvanized Western governments. Above all, the Khalistan motion, in contrast to Islamist terrorism, not often poses a direct risk to the West. Its violence primarily targets India (although its supporters have threatened Indian diplomats within the West, and in 1985 Sikh terrorists blew up an Air India jet that took off from Montreal, killing all onboard, most of them Canadians).

Additionally, Sikh separatist violence has declined lately, protecting it out of the headlines within the West, the place many are unaware how severe a risk it was once, and maybe lowering governments’ risk perceptions. A Khalistan insurgency raged in India within the Nineteen Eighties and Nineteen Nineties. Back then, in reality, U.S. officers had been fairly involved about it: A declassified CIA memo revealed in 1987 referred to Sikh extremism as a “long-term terrorism threat.” Three years earlier, radical Khalistan supporters had seized a Sikh temple in Amritsar, India, sparking a bloody government crackdown and prompting two of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Sikh bodyguards to assassinate her. This provoked revenge assaults on Sikhs and spiritual violence which, on the time, was the worst because the 1947 Partition of British-ruled India into impartial India and Pakistan. Indians have not forgotten about these traumatic occasions, however many within the West, particularly exterior Canada, aren’t even conscious of them.

Democracy additionally drives the West’s restraint. India believes many harmful Sikh separatists are primarily based in Western international locations — Canada, Great Britain, Australia and the U.S, all members of the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing alliance. But these international locations uphold democratic ideas that give nonviolent Sikh activists area to collect and exhibit. They do not wish to provoke insurance policies that threat conflating the small variety of violent Sikh separatists with the a lot bigger variety of nonviolent Sikh neighborhood members — a few of whom have advocated peacefully for a separate Sikh state. (Some Indian commentators claim that in Canada, Trudeau’s want to not upset Sikh voters prompts Ottawa to deal with Khalistan extremists with child gloves.)

In the approaching days, Washington can anticipate to get an earful from India a few rising Khalistan risk emanating from Western soil and the necessity for Washington and its Five Eyes allies to do extra to counter it. It’ll be a fragile dialog, and never simply due to New Delhi’s present perceptions of Western impassivity — and likewise the rising issues amongst U.S.-based Sikhs, intensified by FBI warnings, about potential risks to their security. There’s a historic grievance, too. Some distinguished Indians — together with Indira Gandhi and former senior intelligence officer B. Raman — have alleged that the U.S. covertly backed Sikh separatists within the Seventies and Nineteen Eighties, when Washington was in a Cold War alliance with Islamabad, a probable sponsor of the Khalistan motion (India has lengthy accused Pakistan of backing Sikh separatists, and Pakistan formally denies the fees, however former senior Pakistani intelligence officers have acknowledged that Pakistani operatives have supplied assist to Sikh separatists).

There’s no proof to assist the allegation that Washington covertly backed the Khalistan motion. But it underscores the distrust that bothered U.S.-India ties in a earlier period. The relationship has since skilled fast progress, particularly with Washington now viewing New Delhi as a important counterweight in opposition to Chinese energy. And but, differing U.S. and Indian positions on Khalistan at this time are a sobering reminder that even in an in any other case deep partnership, some historic baggage nonetheless lingers.